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I. ΠΡΟΣ WITH THE ACCUSATIVE.

II. NOTE ON THE ANTIGONE.

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ON ΠΡΟΣ WITH THE ACCUSATIVE.

In Homer *πρός* with the accusative in the majority of cases accompanies verbs of motion, or such verbs as in themselves, or by virtue of the context in which they stand, necessarily carry with them the idea of motion: in such constructions the preposition indicates that towards which, it may be that up to which, the motion is directed. The largest exception to this is found in its use with the verbs of saying, speaking and the like; it may be doubted, however, whether we have here so much of an exception, as we might at first be inclined to think: such expressions as *φωνὴν ἀφιέναι* (Dem. I., 2), which are not rare in the orators, show how naturally speech was conceived as a form of motion, and the Homeric expression *ἔπεα πτερόεντα* indicates that originally words uttered were conceived of, in the most literal sense, as words set in motion towards the person addressed. It may be that the idea of motion (by no means figurative, but representing to men of those days a very real conception) had already become somewhat blurred, or rather was already losing something of its clearness; but that its force was still, though perhaps but dimly, felt, may be seen, I think, from a comparison of the Homeric phrases, *εἶπε πρὸς ὃν—θυμόν* (Λ 403) *προτὶ ὃν μυθήσατο θυμόν* (Ρ 200), with the later formulas *ἀναμνησθῆναι, λογίζεσθαι, ἐνθυμεῖσθαι πρὸς ἑαυτόν*, so common in the orators. An extension of the use with verbs of saying, with a weaker hold upon the idea of motion, is found in *ὤμοσε πρὸς ἐμέ*, which occurs twice in the Odyssey (*ξ* 331, *τ* 288); in this we still have a sense of the passage of words of a definite character (indicated by the verb) from one person to another in actual presence, while we discern a possibility of further expansion towards the expression of manifold

mutual transactions between persons. In Θ 364: ἦ τοι ὁ μὲν κλαίεσκε πρὸς οὐρανόν, αὐτάρ ἐμὲ Ζευς | τῷ ἐπαλεξήσουσαν ἀπ' οὐρανόθεν προΐαλλεν, the cries are spoken of as addressed not to persons, but πρὸς οὐρανόν, and although the gods are felt to be included in the phrase πρὸς οὐρανόν, and the next line with its Ζεύς makes this quite clear, yet there is an attempt, which was to go much further, at overstepping the personal category in the use of πρός with verbs of speech That the cries are uttered not merely 'heavenward,' but sent forth to heaven to be heard there, the next line with its ἀπ' οὐρανόθεν proves.

With verbs of glancing, looking, peering, the idea of motion was unquestionably present originally; one may cast looks as well as spears, *cf.* π 179: ταρβήσας δ' ἑτέρσωσε βάλ' ὄμματα. It is not matter of surprise, then, that Homer should use this construction, which becomes so familiar to us in later Greek; the only wonder is that it does not occur oftener. There are three instances, all in the Odyssey; μ 244: ἡμεῖς μὲν πρὸς τὴν ἴδομεν (*cf.* σκεψάμενος δ' ἐς νῆα θοήν, μ 247) μ 232: ἔκαμον δέ μοι ὅσσε πάντῃ παπταίνοντι πρὸς ἠεροειδέα πέτρην, χ 24: πάντοσε παπταίνοντας ἐυδμήτους ποτὶ τοίχους.

The sense of motion, however, is already leading the way to that of direction, irrespective of motion. The verb τρέπω would seem to have had a large share in causing this development; compare M 273: μή τις ὀπίσσω τετράφθω ποτὶ νῆας, with E 605: ἀλλὰ πρὸς Τρῶας τετραμμένοι αἰὲν ὀπίσσω εἴκετε. The first of these passages has the sense of 'turning and moving towards,' while in the second we have the picture of men facing in one direction and moving in the opposite. We find the sense of turning with implication of directed motion in M 273, ι 315: πρὸς ὄρος τρέπε μῆλα Κύκλωψ; of motion to assume, or face in, a certain direction in E 605, ν 29: πρὸς ἠέλιον κεφαλὴν τρέπε and τ 389: ποτὶ δὲ σκότον ἐτράπετο; of direction with the idea of motion excluded in μ 80: ἐστὶ σπέος ἠεροειδὲς πρὸς

ζόφον εἰς Ἔρεβος τετραμμένον. All of these passages contain τρέπω; and there is in them a regular progress from distinct implication of motion of translation, through motion about a fixed point, to direction of position. This point having once been reached, there is no difficulty felt in using this construction with verbs denoting simple situation to denote, not the exact position where the object is to be found, but the line of direction on which it lies from the point of reference assumed by the writer. Of this there are two examples; ν 240: ἠμὲν ὅσοι ναίουσι πρὸς ἠῶ τ' ἠέλιόν τε, ἠδ' ὅσσοι μετόπισθε ποτὶ ζόφον ἠερόεντα, ι 25: εἰν ἁλὶ κεῖται πρὸς ζόφον, αἱ δέ τ' ἄνευθε πρὸς ἠῶ τ' ἠέλιόν τε. It is noteworthy that both of these passages are found in the Odyssey and are, moreover, such as would most early and most easily be adopted, 'Eastward,' 'Westward.'

From the construction with verbs signifying 'moving towards and placing, or assuming a position, at,' there arises a tendency to use πρός with the accusative of position at or near, the degree of proximity being left to the context to determine. After reading expressions like ποτὶ τοῖχον ἀρηρότες (β 342), ἔστησε πρὸς κίονα (α 127), ἑστάμεναι πρὸς ἐνώπια (χ 121), πρὸς γοῦνα καθέζετο (σ 395), and others of like character, we experience no shock on coming across M 64: σκόλοπες γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ ὀξέες ἑστᾶσιν, ποτὶ δ' αὐτοὺς τεῖχος Ἀχαιῶν, and H 337: ποτὶ δ' αὐτὸν δείμομεν ὦκα πύργους ὑψηλοὺς. In M 64, Poulydamas is warning Hektor of the extreme danger of attacking the Greeks, now entrenched behind wall and ditch: the sense is, 'sharp stakes stand in the ditch, and next them stands the wall of the Greeks.' The wall is only 'near' the stakes; how near is not specified, except so far as the general idea running through the passage raises in our minds a more definite determination. Leaf's difficulty about the space between the wall and the ditch is based upon a misunderstanding of ποτί, which he takes in a sense it often bears,

but not here, as 'coming up to.' Lang's 'over against them' is a perfect rendering. This passage calls for two remarks bearing upon after developments in the use of the preposition; first, the plural αὐτούς, helped, of course, by the sense of τεῖχος, suggests, hardly more than suggests, the notion of parallelism; we feel indistinctly the row of stakes set near, or 'over against,' the wall, and in a line with it; a trace of a recognition of this sense in the passage may perhaps be discovered in the curious variant περί: second, the order of the objects, as seen by Polydamas, from the side of the Trojans, was, first the ditch with the stakes in it, and then the wall, and yet he speaks of the wall as being ποτὶ αὐτούς. Considering the sense from which this use of the preposition was developed, there is here what may be called a change of sides on the part of πρός: our renderings 'at' and 'over against' leave us insensible to this; but the Scholiast's paraphrase ἐντός would seem to indicate that something of the sort had struck him. If we discard the position of the speaker, again, and look only to the natural relations of the objects, the same peculiarity appears, for it must have been originally more natural to speak of the stakes being πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος, than of the wall as being πρὸς τοὺς σκόλοπας. And so in H 440 we find it said in more natural phrase (natural, that is, according to the relations between them), ἐπ' αὐτῷ (*i. e.*, τῷ τείχει) τάφρον ὄρυξαν—, ἐν δὲ σκόλοπας κατέπηξαν. In H 337, the meaning probably is 'at it' (Leaf renders 'thereto') 'let us build high towers with speed.' If we compare this with M 64, it will appear, I think, more reasonable not to suppose with Leaf that the wall is to abut upon the sepulchral mound, which would thus be utilized as a part of the fortification, but rather to place the mound inside or on the Grecian side of the wall. In the plural πύργους there is the same suggestion of parallelism that was found in M 64, and, curiously enough, the preposition περί reappears, not, to be sure, as a variant this time, but

as interpretation in the Scholia. There is not, however, the same change of sides in πρός, since Nestor is not speaking of things already existing in a position fixed with reference to his own, but of a tomb to be first constructed and of the after-construction of a wall, the line of which is to be drawn ποτὶ αὐτόν, so that the natural relations are preserved.

The construction easily lends itself to express the reciprocal encounter of conflicting motions. Π 768: αἵ τε πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἔβαλον τανυήκεας ὄζους, Φ 302: τοῦ δ' ὕψοσε γούνατ' ἐπήδα πρὸς ῥόον ἀίσσοντος ἀν' ἰθύν, οὐδέ μιν ἴσχεν εὐρὺ ῥέων ποταμός. An offshoot of this is the use with verbs of fighting, which appears once in Homer, P 471: πρὸς Τρῶας μάχεαι. But slightly different is P 94: ὁππότ' ἀνὴρ ἐθέλῃ πρὸς δαίμονα φωτὶ μάχεσθαι, for here the expression πρὸς δαίμονα (deo invito) seems to be due to the influence of μάχεσθαι; the same words, in the same sense, but without the softening accompaniment of μάχεσθαι, are met ten lines further on (P 104), where they must be regarded as nothing more than a reëcho of a construction that had caught the ear as pithy and convenient. In μ 350 we read βούλομ' ἅπαξ πρὸς κῦμα χανὼν ἀπὸ θυμὸν ὀλέσσαι, 'with one gasp at the (inflowing) wave.' If this be compared with Φ 302, it will be seen that from active encounter with opposing motion we have passed to passive reception of it. Achilles makes head against the swollen stream, Eurylochos will face the wave and receive it as it flows at him. In an expression of motion, then, as above in one of position, πρός has, so to say, changed sides; the subject (or agent) does not move at the object, but the object moves at the subject, and this it is that produces the encounter. The fact that in such a case as this the form of the expression is as natural in English as in Greek, is very apt to blind us to what is really peculiar in it. But when we come to the extensions which this use of πρός receives in later Greek, extensions that go beyond the sphere of admissible

English usage, then we are indeed startled; and yet, when once we recognize the fact that πρός can denote the encounter of reciprocal actions (and this is so natural that we find no difficulty in it), we should be equally prepared to go a short step further and admit that in such cases there may be a syntactical interchange of the active and the passive, of the course of the action and that upon which it spends itself. Usage naturally would put limits in Greek as in English, upon such a transfer, and it would be interesting to determine those limits; but the principle should be accepted. But of this I shall have something more to say further on.—But we may have reciprocity without hostility; the encounter may be a friendly one; we may exchange courtesies as well as blows; Z 235: ὃς πρὸς Τυδεΐδην Διομήδεα τεύχε' ἄμειβεν. Giving and taking is one sort of motion. In this passage, and in the passage ὦμοσε πρὸς ἐμέ of ξ 331 and τ 288, ground is broken for the growth and development of this construction in the expression of compacts and business relations.

The temporal use in ρ 191: ποτὶ ἕσπερα, 'towards evening,' is evidently based on the idea of motion transferred from space to time; it is entirely analogous to the πρὸς ζόφον of ν 240, 225.

In all the Homeric examples, however clear or obscure the idea of motion may be, the physical relation between subject and object is unmistakeable.

It is not proposed here to treat of the history of this construction in post-Homeric literature, but merely to touch upon the main applications of it, as exemplified in the Attic orators, calling attention more particularly to certain developments, which do not seem to have been perfectly apprehended.

Though I cannot claim to have made an exhaustive collection of examples, a thing which did not enter within my purpose, certain impressions, gathered from the examination I have made, may perhaps be profitably recorded,

which further investigation may modify, but I do not think will nullify. These may be stated by way of preface.

Antiphon is very sparing in his use of the construction. His examples are mostly confined to expressions belonging to, or arising out of, court proceedings; one is particularly natural in the mouth of an Athenian defendant in a criminal suit (*ἀνακλαύσασθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς*), and another is a general expression of business dealing and intercourse (*πράττειν πρός τινα*). Andokides, without indulging largely, has a wider range of use; this is in part, at least, due to the historical matter that enters his orations. Such phrases as *σπονδαί, εἰρήνη, συμμαχία πρός τινας* are found; but private relations, other than those of business, also appear. In Lysias the sphere of use is considerably extended; he avails himself of it to indicate relations of the most varied kinds (*ἔχθρα, διαφορά, φιλονικία, ὀργή, σπουδή, πιστός, δεινός, κίνδυνος, ὁμολογεῖσθαι*). In a couple of instances he appears to have been tempted to make rather bold experiments with the construction; one of these may have been a colloquialism, which he had the courage to introduce into the more formal region of written language. Isokrates abounds in the construction; of particularly frequent occurrence in his speeches is the use with words denoting fitness or capacity, natural or acquired (*χρήσιμος, ἁρμόττων, ὠφελεῖν, πεπαιδευμένος, καταδεέστερος, συμφέρων, διαφέρειν*). This is easily accounted for by the character of his subjects and by the repeated defenses he feels called upon to make of his own scheme for the higher education of the youth of Athens. Isaios, without retiring to the position of Andokides or Antiphon, is more restricted than Lysias in range of use, though, perhaps, not in quantity. Aischines, Deinarchos and Lykourgos avail themselves of the construction with comparative freedom; but neither they, nor Isaios, nor Isokrates appear to have ever thought of stepping beyond the lines custom had by this time drawn. Enough for them to take usage as they found it, and turn it to

account as their purposes and subject matter seemed to demand. In Demosthenes we find the construction frequently, though hardly, I think, with such frequency as in Isokrates, and, as might be expected, wherever it is profitably available; but, what is more, he has no fear of hazarding occasionally, where anything is to be gained by it, a very bold use or even (as he has certainly done in one instance, 20. 25) a somewhat startling experiment.

Motion in the literal and physical sense, motion of translation in a given direction continues in post-Homeric Greek, of course, to be expressed by πρός, precisely as in Homer. The same is true of the use with verbs and expressions implying motion, although, of course, we are not surprised to find expressions of this sort that would look strange in Homer, *e.g.*, Isokrates, 17. 52: πρὸς τὴν πόλιν συγγράψας ἐπιστολήν: 'having written a letter to (a person) in the city.' The derived notions of direction and of position at or near, likewise persist. It is sometimes difficult to disentangle these two last, or, perhaps, one should rather say both ideas are simultaneously present in some cases; this being due to the fact that the notion of position may be approached either from the more indefinite sense of 'moving towards' or from the more definite of 'moving towards and taking up a position at.' *cf.*, Andok. 1. 38: ὁρῶν δὲ αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν σελήνην τὰ πρόσωπα τῶν πλείστων γιγνώσκειν, with which compare Thukyd. 7. 44: ἑώρων δὲ οὕτως ἀλλήλους ὡς ἐν σελήνῃ τὴν μὲν ὄψιν τοῦ σώματος προορᾶν. In this the idea seems to cover more than the ἐν σελήνῃ of Thukyd., and to imply that they stood in the moonlight 'facing' the moon. It may be remarked here, to avoid the necessity of doing so later, that we not infrequently appear to find different uses of πρός converging to a point, as it were, in a given example, each of them contributing its part towards completing the sense, and by their combination, at the same time, rendering translation more difficult and positive classification in a rigorous gen-

ealogical scheme almost, if not quite, impossible. Such a phrase, for instance, as *τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον κινδύνων* (Isokr. 4. 26) unquestionably was developed from the cognate and yet quite different phrase, *οἱ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους κίνδυνοι*, but it unquestionably must have been formed under the influence of the same idiom that gave rise to *ἡ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιστήμη* (Lys. 33. 7).

By an easy and natural transition from these uses we pass beyond the sphere of motion and position in the material world, and get certain transferred senses, in which motion resolves itself into tendency, incitement, furtherance, advance, and position into application or occupation. Instances of the first are Isokr. 15. 67: *οἱ λόγοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην συντείνουσιν*, 15. 277; Aisch. 1. 96: *ἠπείγετο σφόδρα πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς*; 1. 43: *παρωξυμμένος πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα*; 1. 117: *παράκλησις πρὸς ἀρετήν* (*cf.* Plat. Leg. 711, B: *πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἐπιτηδεύματα προτρέπειν*); Lykourg. 106: *πεπαίδευνται πρὸς ἀρετήν*; Isokr. 15. 294, Lys. 19. 61: *οὐ μόνον πρὸς δόξαν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς χρημάτων λόγον λυσιτελεῖ ὑμῖν*; Isokr. 15. 266: *τὴν μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μήτε πρὸς τὸ πράττειν ὠφελοῦσαν*; Isokr. 13. 20 and 15. 189: *μεγίστην ἔχει δύναμν πρὸς τὴν τῶν λόγων παιδείαν*; 8. 32 and 15. 212: *οὐδὲν ἄν ἀλλήλους πρὸς ἐπιείκειαν εὐεργετήσαιμεν*; 15. 269: *τῶν πράξεων τὰς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸν βίον φερούσας*, 1. 12: *πρός ἀρετὴν ἐπιδοῦναι*. In the last example we have a double transference: First, from motion of translation to growth (*cf.* *ἐς ὕψος ἐπιδοῦναι*, *ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἐπιδοῦναι*), and secondly, from physical growth to mental and moral. Analogous to this, in so far as elaboration can be analogous to growth, is Isokr. 4. 11: *τοὺς πρὸς ὑπερβολὴν πεπονημένους* (*λόγους*), where the adverbial phrase *πρὸς ὑπερβολήν* is exactly our 'to excess.' It must be confessed that in Isokrates' day *πρὸς ὑπερβολήν* was hardly felt except as an adverb; yet the example may stand here as showing how this adverbial phrase originated. Isokr. 15. 156: *τοσοῦτον προλαβὼν πρὸς τὸ πλείω κτήσασθαι τῶν ἄλλων*. Such ex-

pressions as πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδεύεσθαι and πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐπιδοῦναι, it is often more natural (that is to us English-speaking people) to render 'to train in virtue,' 'to grow in virtue,' and we may perhaps be led to think that ἀρετή here gives the road along or in which progress is made, rather than the objective point towards which; but a comparison of the two other phrases above given, ἐς ὕψος ἐπιδοῦναι ('grow *in* height') and ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἐπιδοὺναι, will suffice to prove, I think, that such was not the Greek conception. Another false road that must be avoided, if we would not be led astray, is opened for us by the frequent meaning of πρός (to be afterwards referred to), 'with reference to.' This conveniently vague phrase is admissible in so many and in so great a variety of connections in English that one is often tempted to rest in it with all its lack of preciseness at the risk of missing, what it is most important for us to secure: an exact perception of the mode and form in which the thought to be rendered presented itself to the Greek mind. When, for instance, we have translated πάσχω πρὸς αὐτόν, 'I feel,' or 'experience with reference to him,' the chances are nine in ten that the rendering is but a cloak to cover our real ignorance of the import of the Greek words, that is, their import to the mind of the Greek writer and his Greek readers.

As regards application or occupation, the analogon in transferred sense of position in the physical world, the extreme instance must suffice, the Platonic πρός τι εἶναι, 'to be at (engaged upon) a thing,' with which may be compared the other Platonic phrase ἐπί τι ἰέναι, or the ἤδη ἐπὶ ταῦτα πορεύσομαι of Dem. 18. 124.

In Homer (M 64) we have already found the idea of parallelism of position suggested, if only suggested. It is to be carefully remembered that the denotation of πρός, irrespective of possible connotation, in this passage, was merely 'at,' 'near,' or perhaps more strictly 'over against,' 'facing.' The possibility of denoting parallelism did not

belong to πρός originally, nor did it come to it directly from the sense of motion, but only secondarily from that of position, with the assistance of other words in the sentence. This order of derivation has imposed upon πρός in this application certain limitations, from which it never freed itself. The parallelism it conveys is the parallelism of consecutive positions, and not that of continuous motion. These consecutive positions, in the first instance, were those of corresponding rows of objects (as of the individual stakes and the corresponding points in the line of wall in M 64), set over against one another; but by an easy extension they might become the positions consecutively assumed by two objects, which continue at each and every moment of the time considered to stand over against one another in some unvaried fashion. This form of parallelism cannot be put into simple expressions of motion, into which this notion of successive positions does not enter, and so we may not say πρὸς τὸν ποταμόν in the sense in which we may say παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν πορεύεσθαι; the contrast in the effect of the preposition in such phrases as: ἰέναι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους and ἀντιτάττεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους will make this clear to every one. But in a transferred sense, where two events or series of events are going on simultaneously, which are so connected the one with the other that there is a fixed relation of correspondence between their component parts, so that the amount of progress in the one series finds its perfect analogue in the contemporaneous progress in the other, πρός with the accusative may be, and is, used to denote such correspondence. Dem. 29. 9: ὃ γὰρ τότ' ἐν μικρῷ μέρει τινὶ τοῦ παντὸς ὕδατος μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγορήσαμεν, νῦν πρὸς ἅπαν τὸ ὕδωρ αὐτὸ καθ'αὑτὸ διδάξειν ἐμέλλομεν, Aisch. 1. 109: ἅπαντα διεξελθεῖν πρὸς μικρόν μέρος τῆς ἡμέρας οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπιχειρεῖν, Dem. 41. 30, 43. 8. Again, the idea of progress of events being subordinated, or even lost sight of, the correspondence, in whole and in parts, of spaces in which

events are, or may be, conceived as occurring, is thus expressed: Aisch. 2. 126: *πρὸς ἕνδεκα ἀμφορέας ἐν διαμεμετρημένῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ κρίνομαι*, where *πρὸς ἕνδεκα ἀμφορέας* is to be taken with *διαμεμετρημένῃ* and not with *κρίνομαι*. Let the component parts of the series fall into the background, and such expressions become possible as Dem. 19. 120: *ἀγῶνας καινοὺς πρὸς διαμεμετρημένην τὴν ἡμέραν αἱρεῖς διώκων*, 53. 17: *εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον πρὸς ἡμέραν διαμεμετρημένην*. These phrases are very inadequately rendered by the English 'on,' for they are not simple expressions of time at, on or about which something is said to take place; they are something very different from *πρὸς ἠῶ ἔγρεσθαι*, *πρὸς ἡμέραν ἐξέγρεσθαι*. A correspondence is indicated that goes beyond simultaneity of date, a correspondence in length, and consequent nature, of the suits to the character of the day appointed for them. If it be said that this idea is more of an inference from the participle *διαμεμετρημένην*, it may be replied that it is just this participle that brings about the use of *πρός*, as the preposition best suited to the idea to be expressed. This idea of correspondence is at the bottom of such uses of *πρός* as *πρὸς αὐλὸν ᾄδειν*, *πρὸς ῥυθμὸν ἐμβαίνειν*, as well as of the mathematical use in statements of proportion. Correspondence becomes conformity: Lys. 18. 4: *οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεταβάλλονται πρὸς τὰ παρόντα*, Isokr. 6. 34: *πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀεὶ βουλεύεσθαι*, Aisch. 2. 66: *οἱ τῶν συκοφαντῶν λόγοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐφ' ἡμέραν καιροὺς λέγονται*, Dem. 24. 139: *πρὸς τὰς βουλήσεις νομοθετεῖσθαι*, Dem. 15. 28: *ὁρῶ γὰρ ἅπαντας πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν δύναμιν τῶν δικαίων ἀξιουμένους*, Dem. 45, 14: *ταῦτα ἄλλος ἂν ἄλλως πράξειε πρὸς τὸν αὑτοῦ τρόπον*, Dem. 41. 5: *τὴν οἰκίαν ταύτην ἀποτιμῶμαι πρὸς τὰς δέκα μνᾶς* (that is, 'as a set-off to,' 'as collateral security for'). In an extreme case conformity gives equality: Dem. 20. 31: *πρὸς τοίνυν ἅπαντα τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἐμπορίων ἀφικνούμενον ὁ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου σῖτος εἰσπλέων ἐστίν*: *cf.* Hdt. 8. 44: *Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν πρὸς πάντας*

τοὺς ἄλλους παρεχόμενοι νῆας ὀγδώκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν, and Ibid. 8. 48: ἀριθμὸς ἐγένετο ὁ πᾶς τῶν νεῶν τριηκόσιαι καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ὀκτώ; the equality is, of course, as these passages show, and as might have been inferred without them, an approximate one, but, as the phrase goes, one that is 'near enough for all practical purposes.'

Personal conformity, even the determination of life and actions by those of another, or by the interests, wishes or suggestions of another, may be thus conveyed by a sort of abridged construction. The bridge is furnished by such an example as Isokr. 1. 11: δεῖγμα τῆς Ἱππονίκου φύσεως νῦν ἐξενηνόχαμεν, πρὸς ὃ δεῖ σε ζῆν ὥσπερ πρὸς παράδειγμα, νόμον μὲν τὸν ἐκείνου τρόπον ἡγησάμενον, μιμητὴν δὲ καὶ ζηλωτὴν τῆς πατρῴας ἀρετῆς γενόμενον; Dem. 19. 226: τοῖς δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ζῶσι καὶ τῆς παρ' ὑμῶν τιμῆς γλιχομένοις καὶ μὴ προδεδωκόσι. The extreme instance. Dem. 19. 63: τούτῳ δὴ πάντ' ἐπίστευον (οἱ Φωκεῖς) καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον πάντ' ἐσκόπουν, πρὸς τοῦτον ἐποιοῦντο τὴν εἰρήνην; τούτῳ is Aischines, and the meaning is that the unfortunate Phokians were guided in the views they formed as to their situation and the line of action it called for on their part by the declarations Aischines had just before publicly made in the Athenian assembly; and so, in conformity to the hints thus given and the hopes thus held out, they were deluded into making the peace. It may not be amiss to call attention to the fact that the tenses Demosthenes uses are imperfects; 'the views they held and their course in making peace were determined by &c.' Compare the sentence immediately preceding: Φίλιππος ἀπηγγέλλετο πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὑπὸ τούτου ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν Φωκέων σωτηρίᾳ παρεληλυθέναι.

In Dem. 56. 49 we read: μερίζειν τοὺς τόκους πρὸς τὸν πλοῦν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὴν συγγραφήν, the last words of which convey quite distinctly a stricter sense than that of conformity in general; they denote conformity to a standard, the συγγραφή gives the standard conformably to which the division of the interest is to be made. In a business and

legal phrase of this sort the meaning is so sharply impressed as to be unquestionable. In everyday conversational language, however, such phrases are wont to be employed with less preciseness of signification. As the application of a standard is peculiarly natural to the operations of judging, examining and testing, we meet such phrases as *κρίνειν, ἐξετάζεσθαι, σκοπεῖν πρὸς τι*, 'to judge, examine, investigate, by a certain standard,' that is, 'to form our judgments, make our tests according to, or in conformity with, a certain standard.' But, as comparison is the method by which the assumed standard is always applied, the notion of the standard in these phrases fades out and that of comparison grows, so that finally we have nothing left but the comparative examination of two objects; the border land between these two, application of standard and simple comparison, will supply examples which may be differently interpreted, though the difference will never have any serious consequences. Isokr. 8. 89: *ὥσπερ πρὸς δεῖγμα τοῦτ' ἀναφέρων*; Isokr. 20. 6: *οὐ πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος ὧν ἂν λάβωσι τὴν τίμησιν ποιουμένους*, Dem. 27. 22: *εἴ τι δεῖ τεκμαίρεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἄλλον τρόπον καὶ ἀναίδειαν*, Dem. 20. 13: *οὐ τὸ λυσιτελέστατον πρὸς ἀργύριον σκοποῦν*, Isokr. 4. 76: *οὐδὲ πρὸς ἀργύριον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔκριναν*, Isokr. 15, 34: *οὐ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν κρίνουσιν*, Isokr. 4. 11: *τοὺς λόγους πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας σκοποῦσιν*, Aisch. 2. 80: *χρὴ δὲ τοὺς μὲν πρέσβεις θεωρεῖν πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν καθ' ὃν ἐπρέσβευον, τοὺς δὲ στρατηγοὺς πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεις ὧν ἡγοῦντο*, Dem. 17. 18: *ἵνα πρὸς τὸν ὑπάρχοντα καιρὸν ἕκαστα θεωρῆτε* (compare the whole sentence, of which these words are the conclusion), Dem. 18. 315: *πρὸς τοὺς πρὸ ἐμαυτοῦ νῦν ἐγὼ κρίνωμαι καὶ θεωρῶμαι*; in this last passage, with its continuation, there seems to be a wavering between the idea of applying a standard and making a mere comparison; in the words here quoted the 'standard' seems to be present, but when we come to the following words *πρὸς σὲ καὶ ἄλλον εἴ τινα βούλει*, the

'standard' has given place to an ordinary object of comparison. Isokr. 12. 4: *μὴ παραβάλλωσι πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων ποικιλίαν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν αὐτὸν* (*sc.* *τὸν λόγον*) *κρίνωσι*: This, while giving in its first portion a full-fledged comparison, closes with an equally decided instance of the application of an assumed standard, so that an examination of it will make clear what and how great is the difference between the two.

As judgment by a standard and comparison tend to run together, it might be thought that the idea of the standard grew out of that of comparison. While admitting that it might, I do not think that in the syntax of *πρός* it really did; nor do I think, on the other hand, that the reverse process took place. It seems to me more likely that the notion of juxtaposition, when expressed with the aid of *πρός* by certain verbs, especially such as were compounded with *παρά*, furnished an independent, though cognate, source for the development of the sense of comparison, and that the two streams ultimately converged, as must often happen. In the use with such verbs as *παραβάλλειν* the parallelism that leads to comparison, the putting side by side, is conveyed almost solely by the verb; all that *πρός* contributes is the idea of nearness or approach. From its accompanying such verbs *πρός* took over to itself something of their peculiar significance, the more easily perhaps from the general sense of parallelism it had already independently acquired, and was finally found strong enough to bear the whole burden of the conception on its own shoulders unaided, except in so far as the context, in a general way, might help it out. In Isokr. 5. 142, we have *ἀντιπαραβαλών*, 7. 62: *παραβάλωμεν*, 12. 4.: *παραβάλλωσι*, 12, 227: *τὴν παραβολὴν πεποιῆσθαι*, Deinarch. 1. 16: *παραβάλλειν*, Isokr. 12. 40: *παριστάναι*, Lykourg. 68: *συμβαλεῖν*, Isokr. 15. 158 and Dem. 41. 27: *τιθέναι*. Isokr. 15 157: *τοὺς ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς τέχναις ὄντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους κρινειν*, Isokr. 19, 48: *εἴ τίς με σκοποῖτο μὴ πρὸς ταύτην*,

Dem. 18. 256: *τὴν ἐμὴν τύχην πρὸς τὴν σεαυτοῦ σκόπει.* In this category no one has ventured so far as Lysias, who has in 1. 2: *ἡ αὐτὴ τιμωρία τοῖς ἀσθενεστάτοις πρὸς τοὺς τὰ μέγιστα δυναμένους ἀποδίδοται, ὥστε τὸν χείριστον τῶν αὐτῶν τυγχάνειν τῷ βελτίστῳ.*

Verbs of glancing and looking, or of directing eyes or sight towards an object, represented by but a small contingent in Homer, are common enough in later Greek, and such expressions as *βλέπων πρὸς ὑμᾶς* (Aisch. 1. 163) in a literal sense, and *πρὸς αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἀποβλέποντας* (Aisch. 1. 178), in a transferred sense, hardly need to be quoted.

Verbs of speaking, as has been seen, are largely represented in Homer with this construction, largely, that is, when the number of instances is considered, for the list of the verbs so used is somewhat limited (*εἰπεῖν, μυθεῖσθαι, ἀγορεύειν, φάναι, ἐνέπειν*, and of verbs implying speech, *ὀμνύναι* and *κλαίειν*). Later Greek, as might be expected, both uses the construction frequently, and greatly extends the list of verbs so used. All verbs or phrases expressing or implying the address of words to others are now included in it; and, following the line of the Homeric *προτὶ ὃν μυθήσατο θυμόν*, verbs of thought, which imply language addressed to, or held with, oneself, have come to adopt this construction. A still further extension brings in also verbs of declaring, proving, showing and displaying, even where the use of language is not implied. Verbs of speech: Dem. 19. 136: *εἰπεῖν*, Aisch. 1. 8: *πρὸς ὑμᾶς χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ*, 1. 122: *πρὸς ἄλλους ἦν ὁ λόγος μοι*, 3. 219: *πρὸς τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν διαλεγομένου*, 1. 8: *διέξειμι πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοὺς νόμους*, Dem. 29. 4: *διεξελθεῖν*, Aisch. 2. 125: *πρὸς ὃν ἀντειπεῖν*, Lys. 32, 26: *πρὸς ὑμᾶς λογίζεσθαι*, Aisch. 1. 173: *κατεπαγγέλλεται πρὸς αὐτούς*, 2. 13: *ἀπαγγέλλειν*, 3. 189: *τὴν ἀνάρρησιν ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας*, Isai. 2. 18: *ἐκεῖνον πρὸς τοὺς δημότας ἐπαινεῖν*, Cisch. 2. 45: *ἐπαινέτης ἦν ἡμῶν πρὸς τοὺς βουλεύοντας*, Antiph. A. δ.

1: ἀνακλαύσασθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, Aisch. 2. 1: παρακελεύσασθαι πρὸς ἄνδρας ὁμωμοκότας ('address exhortations to'), Isokr. 17. 9: πρὸς ἐμὲ προσεποιεῖτ' ἀπορεῖν, Deinarch. 1. 49: ψεύδεσθαι πρὸς τινας, Isokr. 17. 9: ἔξαρνος γίγνεται πρὸς αὐτούς. Of evidence, promises, oaths uttered to, or in the presence of: Aisch. 2. 19: κάλει μοι πρὸς οὓς ἐξεμαρτύρησεν, Isai. 3. 25: ἐκμαρτυρησάμενος, Isokr. 15, 186: τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἃς ποιούμεθα πρὸς τοὺς πλησιάζειν ἡμῖν βουλομένους, Aisch. 1. 143: τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν τὴν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, Isokr. 6. 21: τοῖς ὅρκοις οὓς ἐποιήσασθε πρὸς τοὺς προγόνους, Dem. 19. 318: τοὺς πρὸς Θετταλοὺς ὅρκους. Of written address: Dem. 19. 174: τὴν γραφεῖσαν ἐπιστολὴν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, 18. 186: ἐν τῇ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐπιστολῇ. Of thought to or with oneself: Isokr. 6. 52: ἀναμνήσθητε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, Dem. 43. 72: ἐνθυμεῖσθε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, 16. 9: σκοπεῖσθε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, Dem. 36. 8: λογιζόμενοι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. Of declaring, showing, displaying, proving: Dem. 54. 28: πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς εἰσιόντας ἀπέφαινον, Dem. 18. 40: σαφῶς δηλοῖ καὶ διορίζεται πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους, Lykourg. 102: ἐπίδειξιν ποιούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, Aisch. 3. 219: τῆς πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ἐνδείξεως, Lys. 18. 11: παράδειγμα ποιούμενος πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τὰς ἡμετέρας συμφορὰς τῆς τῶν τριάκοντα πονηρίας, Isokr. 5. 149: διελθὼν πρὸς αὐτὸν τεκμήριον, Dem. 49. 57: τεκμηρίῳ καταχρήσασθαι τούτῳ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, Dem. 49. 58: Κἀμοὶ τεκμήριον γενέσθω πρὸς ὑμᾶς.

The instances of verbs of promising and swearing above given bring us at least half way towards the expression of business dealings and relations. A still further approach is to be found in the following: Isai. 9. 24: πρὸς Κλέωνα διωμολογήσατο, Lys. 1. 21: τῶν πρὸς ἔμ' ὡμολογημένων, Isokr. 14. 29, Andok. 1. 120: τὴν πρὸς ἐμὲ ὁμολογίαν. This category, which has but a foreshadowing in Homer, receives, as might be expected, a large development in the orators. Business dealings and relations, personal conduct

between man and man, social intercourse, relations between gods and men in matters of religious duty and piety, international relations—all these come to be expressed by this construction. Πράττειν: Lys. 17. 1: *τὰ πεπραγμέν' ἡμῖν πρὸς Ἐράτωνα*, Isokr. 17. 22: *ἐγὼ δ' ἠξίουν πρὸς μὲν Μενέξενον πράττειν ὅτι βούλοιτο*, Dem. 36, 3: *τὰ πραχθέντα τούτῳ πρὸς Πασίωνα*, Dem. 37. 6, Dem. 45. 2. Contracts and agreements: Isokr. 15. 79: *τὰ συμβόλαια τὰ γιγνόμενα πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς*, Isokr. 17. 2, 17. 23, Dem. 32. 2, 34. 3; Dem. 48, 9: *συνθήκας ἐγράψαμεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς*, Aisch. 2. 47: *τοὺς πρὸς Δημοσθένην αὐτῷ συγκειμένους λόγους*, Lys. 25. 34: *δίκαιον ἡγούμεθ' εἶναι πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς τοὺς πολίτας ταῖς συνθήκαις ἐμμένειν*, Isokr. 18. 27: *περὶ συνθηκῶν τὴν ψῆφον οἴσετε ἃς οὐδεπώποτε οὐθ' ὑμῖν πρὸς ἑτέρους οὔτ' ἄλλοις πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐλυσιτέλησε παραβῆναι*, Dem. 58. 19: *διοικησαμένου πρὸς Κτησικλέα* ('having made an arrangement with'), 58. 20: Partnership: Dem. 48. 28: *τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς πρὸς τοῦτον ταύτ' ἐγὼ ἀπέλαυσα*. Division of an estate: Isai. 7. 25: *τὸ ἡμικλήριον πρὸς ταύτην νειμάμενος*. Of a more general character are the two following, signifying the taking of certain measures or the adoption of a certain course in a matter of business dealing: Dem. 40. 40: *εἰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἐπιεικές ἐστι ταῖς διαιταῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι, πρός γε τοῦτον ἁπάντων δικαιότατον ἦν οὕτω προσφέρεσθαι*, Dem. 48. 22: *ὄντινα τρόπον ἀσφαλέστατα προσοισόμεθα πρὸς τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας*. Quite peculiar is Dem. [58] 1: *ἀτυχήσαντος πρὸς τὴν πόλιν καὶ ὀφλόντος δέκα τάλαντα* (*cf.* Lys. 14. 41: *πρὸς τὴν πόλιν δεδυστυχήκασιν, ἄλλως δὲ κόσμιοί εἰσι*): In the first clause of Dem. 40. 40, just cited, and in this last from pseudo Dem. 58. 1, the preposition has the sense of 'in dealing with' or 'in his dealings with;' that is, from frequent use with verbs denoting explicitly dealings or relations pertaining to the sphere of business, it has become capable of denoting such special kind of relations when used with verbs, which in themselves carry no such implication; the

context, of course, lends its aid, but the difference between the weight of meaning borne by πρός in these examples and in such cases as πράττειν πρός τινα, νέμεσθαι πρός τινα, is evident; πράττειν and νέμεσθαι are much more outspoken in their indication of sphere than is the postponed ὀφλόντος δέκα τάλαντα, for example, of [58]. 1. That the latter phrase, however, has its weight in helping πρός to its specific meaning, is clear from a comparison of the passage quoted from Lysias, which has a supplementary clause of a quite different character.

When the notion of business becomes by usage specified and restricted within more narrow limits, and likewise when it becomes generalized so as to cover and include wider relations, the construction still persists. Dem. 33. 12: ὥστε μήτε τούτῳ πρὸς ἐμὲ μήτ' ἐμοὶ πρὸς τοῦτον πρᾶγμ' εἶναι μηδέν: the speaker has just said that the contract between them had been annulled, so that there was no matter or business left to call for legal adjustment; πρᾶγμα here is not confined to the strict sense of lawsuit, but it approaches such a limitation. In Ant. 6. 12: ἐτύγχανε γάρ μοι πράγματα ὄντα πρὸς Ἀριστίωνα καὶ Φιλῖνον, ἃ ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμην, ἐπειδή περ εἰσήγγειλα, ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως ἀποδεῖξαι τῇ βουλῇ, we have the legal sense pure and simple; the business consisted entirely in the legal proceedings. In Dem. 45. 13: συνέβαινεν ἐκείνως μὲν ἕνα εἶναι, πρὸς ὃν τὰ πράγματα ἐγίγνετό μοι, ὡς δ'οὗτοι μεμαρτυρήκασι, πρὸς πολλούς, the sense is vaguer and more indefinite, and the English 'with whom I would have to deal' is satisfactory enough; but the character of the dealing is after all felt to be legal, the ἕνα and the πολλούς being false witnesses, who are to be prosecuted. In the first of these three examples the πρᾶγμα is a business relation, viewed as the basis of a legal action; in the second it is the legal action itself; in the third it is again the basis of the suit, but it is now a complication not arising out of business, strictly so called, certainly not out of commercial relations. In Dem.

48. 46: διαμαρτύρασθαι ὅτι αὐτῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔτι πρᾶγμα πρὸς τὰς συνθήκας ταύτας 'to protest that he had nothing more to do with this contract' (*cf.* the ground for the protest in the preceding words ὡς οὐκέτι κυρίων οὐσῶν τῶν συνθηκῶν ἐμοὶ καὶ τούτῳ), we have an extension of the use of πρᾶγμα with this construction in two ways; first, though still used with reference to a matter of a strictly business character, πρᾶγμα has gone over to the more general sense of 'business,' 'affair,' 'concern;' and second, the relation is no longer one between persons, but between one of the parties to the contract and the contract itself. In Dem. 21. 195: ὥστε καὶ πρὸς οὓς μηδέν ἐστί σοι πρᾶγμα, λυπεῖσθαι τὴν σὴν θρασύτητα, the idea of business has altogether disappeared, and that of 'dealings with' in the widest and vaguest sense been completely substituted. Though, of course, such a more general sense lies in the πρᾶγμα to begin with, and only waits time and opportunity to declare itself, it is not so clear that it lies in the combination πράγματα πρός τινα; the application of this construction to the expression of action towards dealing with (in any way) is too vague and abstract to be an early use; it is more natural to suppose that the process was from the more specific use, which had already, in one Homeric instance, shown its readiness to start into vigorous life, to the more general. It is not surprising that when πρᾶγμα had thus lost its definiteness of signification, it began to be possible to dispense with the word, at least in negative phrases. Between persons: Dem. 45. 22: ἀλλ' ἐῶ Κηφισοφῶντα· οὔτε γὰρ νῦν μοι πρὸς ἐκεῖνόν ἐστιν, οὔτ' ἐμαρτύρησεν οὐδέν: 'I am not now dealing with him;' the nature of the dealing is implied in the circumstances, 'I am not prosecuting him.' Isokr. 4. 12: ἐμοὶ δ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐκείνους ἐστί (*cf.* just below the explanatory phrase: πρὸς οὓς—περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ποιήσομαι τοὺς λόγους), 'I am not dealing with,' here then, to all intents and purposes, is 'I am not addressing.' From these

examples it is seen that this construction *εἶναί τινι πρός τινα* may be used in its vaguest sense, even when back of that a more explicit sense, not necessarily connected with business, is running in the speaker's mind, provided only that more particular application be implied clearly in the context, or afterwards explicity stated. Between persons and things: Dem. 56. 26: *περὶ τῶν δανειστῶν, οὓς φασι συγκεχωρηκέναι λαβεῖν παρ' αὐτῶν τοὺς εἰς Ῥόδον τόκους, ἔστι μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοῦτο*, 'that action of theirs has nothing to do with us, does not concern or affect us.' So Dem. 18. 21. *οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμέ*: This form in such cases, which gives *πρός* a personal régime, is commoner than that of Dem. 48. 46.

These last examples already trench upon the sphere of personal relations. Aisch. 1. 51: *ὁ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα τοῦτο πράττων*, Isokr. 1. 1: *ἐν ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους συνηθείαις*, Isokr. 2. 47: *συνουσία*, Dem. 52. 16: *σύνοδος*, Isokr. 3. 40: *κοινωνία*, Lys. 16. 10: *πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας οὕτω βεβίωκα*, Lys. 12. 23: *οὔτε πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῖς τοιαῦτα ὑπάρχει οὔτε πρὸς ἐμέ*, Dem. 19. 236: *οὐδὲν ἐμοὶ πρὸς τούτους οἰκεῖον οὐδὲ κοινὸν γέγονεν*, Isokr. 1. 31: *μηδὲ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πλησιαζόντων ὀργὰς ἀπαντᾶν*, Dem. 21. 144: *μεγάλαι πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εὐεργεσίαι*, Dem. 21. 1: *τὴν ὕβριν, ᾗ πρὸς ἅπαντας χρῆται Μειδίας*, Dem. 37. 33: *πρὸς ἐπικλήρους ἀδικήματα*, Aisch. 3. 233: *ἡ χάρις πρὸς ὃν ἐχαρίζετο ἄδηλος γεγένηται*, Dem. 19. 139: *πίνων καὶ φιλανθρωπευόμενος πρὸς αὐτούς*, Dem. 21. 139: *δεινοί τινές εἰσι φθείρεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους* ('give themselves over to, body and soul,' 'sell their soul to,' as it were), Aisch. 1. 70: *ὅστις αὐτὸν κατῄσχυνε πρὸς Ἡγήσανδρον, οὐ δοκεῖ ὑμῖν πρὸς τὸν πόρνον πεπορνεῦσθαι* (*cf.* 1. 52: *πεπορνευμένος· ὁ γὰρ εἰκῇ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς πράττων*), Lys. 14. 41: *πρὸς τὴν πόλιν δεδυστυχήκασιν, ἄλλως δὲ κόσμιοί εἰσι* (*cf.* Dem. 58. 1, above quoted). The personal passes over into the political in Lys. 14. 42: *ἀδίκως καὶ παρανόμως πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πολιτευόμενοι*. In both these aspects the relations between

men are disturbed by discord and disagreements, and these again give opportunity for reconciliations and removal of grievances. From both points of view, therefore, expressions of variance and of the composition of difficulties between individuals fall naturally into the employment of this construction. Variance: Lys. 32. 1: *αἴσχιστον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους διαφέρεσθαι*, Isai. 5. 1: *διαφέρεσθαι*, Dem. 27. 1: *ὥστε μηδεμίαν ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸς τοῦτον διαφοράν*, Andok. 2. 140: *διαφορά*, Dem. 48. 7: *διαφέρεσθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς*, Isokr. 16. 16: *διαφέρεσθαι*, Isokr. 12. 55: *διαβάλλειν*, Isokr. 17. 10: *εἰς διαβολὴν καταστῆσαι*, Aisch. 1. 152: *διαβολὴν γενέσθαι*, Isokr. 17. 27: *διαβολή*, Dem. 55. 5: *μηδὲν ὑμῖν ἦν δυσχερὲς πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, Dem. 41. 9: *ἵνα μηδὲν δυσχερὲς ἡμῖν εἴη πρὸς ἀλλήλους*. Composition and adjustment of differences: Isokr. 17. 20: *ἐὰν διαλλαγῶμεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς*, Isokr. 18. 7: *διαλλάττεσθαι*, Deinarch. 1. 99: *διαλλάττεσθαι*, Lys. 13. 80: *διαλλαγαὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, Dem. 40. 43: *ὅπως ἀπαλλαγῇ πρὸς ἐμέ*, Dem. 38. 1: *γεγενημένων ἀμφοτέρων τούτων (ἀφέσεως καὶ ἀπαλλαγῆς) τῷ πατρὶ πρὸς Ναυσίμαχον*, Dem. 28. 24: *πρὸς τοὺς πράξαντας διαλυσαμένους*, Isai. 2. 40: *ποιησαμένους τῆς ἔχθρας διάλυσιν πρὸς ἡμᾶς*.

Relations and behavior towards the gods: Isai. 6. 49: *πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβεῖν*, Lykourg. 94: *τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐσέβειαν*, Isokr. 10. 31: *εὐσέβεια*, Dem. 59. 74: *τῆς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐλαβείας*, Dem. 59. 109: *τὸ ἀσέβημα τὸ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς*.

All relations that exist between individual men are possible between states, and admit in this case of the same construction, which is naturally extended to others of a similar character, but more particularly international. Isokr. 14. 9: *οὐδ' ὁμολογούμενα φαίνονται διαπραττόμενοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς*, Isokr. 5. 39: *ἰσομοιρῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, Isokr. 12. 42: *πρὸς Ἀργείους καὶ Μεσσηνίους διείλοντο τὴν χώραν*, Andok. 4. 18: *πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις συνεθέμεθα*, Dem. 23. 167: *γράφει τὰς συνθήκας τὰς πρὸς Κηφισόδοτον*, Dem. 6.

21 : ὁμιλίαι, Isokr. 4. 43 : συγγένεια, Dem. 14. 36 : διαφέρεσθαι, Isokr. 5. 35 : διαφορά, Dem. 14. 12 : διαφορά, Isokr. 5. 37 : εἰ πρός τινας αὐτῶν (τῶν πόλεων) ἀηδές τί σοι (Φιλίππῳ) συμβέβηκεν, Dem. 20. 63 : τοῖς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀδικήμασι, Isokr. 3. 33 : διαλλάττεσθαι, Isokr. 4. 94 : διαλλαγαί, Isokr. 12. 160 : διαλύεσθαι, Aisch. 2. 12 : διαλύεσθαι, Isokr. 4. 43 : σπεισαμένους πρὸς ἀλλήλους, Andok. 1. 80 : σπονδαὶ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐγένοντο, Aisch. 2. 30 : τὰς πρὸς Περδίκκαν ἀνοχάς, Andok. 3. 2 : εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι, Isokr. 12. 158 : εἰρήνην συγγράφεσθαι, Dem. 20. 54 : εἰρήνη ἐγένετο, Dem. 19. 54 : εἰρήνη, Aisch. 2. 60 : εἰρήνη, Deinarch 1. 28 : τῷ γράψαντι πρὸς Φίλιππον εἰρήνην, Andok. 3. 30 : συμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι, Andok. 3. 65 and 95 : συμμαχία. Very personal in the relations and actions it suggests is Isokr. 12. 159 : οὔτε νῦν αἰσχύνονται διακολακευόμενοι πρὸς τὸν ἐκείνου (βασιλέως) πλοῦτον.

Expressions of conflict and hostility, which may be included in the general category of dealings and relations, but certainly to begin with were hardly felt as belonging there, are frequently found with πρός in this construction. The single μάχεσθαι of the Iliad has increased in number and drawn in its train a variety of cognate words. Aisch. 1. 64 : ὅστις ὢν πρὸς οὕστινας ἐπολέμει, Dem. 5. 16 : πολεμεῖν, Dem. 5. 14 : πόλεμος, Dem. 4. 3 : πόλεμος, Aisch. 2. 172 : καταστάντες πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους εἰς πόλεμον (*cf.* 173), Dem. 18. 151 : πόλεμος πρὸς τοὺς Ἀμφισσέας ἐταράχθη, Aisch. 2. 106 : συνταράττειν πρὸς ἀλλήλας τὰς πόλεις, Isokr. 8. 20 : ταραχῆς εἰς ἣν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καθέσταμεν, Dem. 23. 103 : ἡ γὰρ ἐκείνων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ταραχὴ καὶ ὑποψία, Dem. 15. 24 : παρατάττεσθαι, Dem. 16. 6 : παρατάττεσθαι, Isokr. 9. 61 : ἀντιτάξας τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώμην πρὸς τὰς οὔτως ὑπερμεγέθεις παρασκευάς, Aisch. 3. 16 : ἀντιτάττειν τὸν νόμον πρὸς τὴν τούτων ἀναίδειαν, Dem. 4. 47 : πρὸς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀγωνίσασθαι, Dem. 8. 33 : πρὸς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐκείνός ἐσθ' ὁ ἀγών, Dem. 53. 14 : ἀγώνων μοι συνεστηκότων πρὸς αὐτούς, Aisch. 3. 189 : τοὶς μὲν πύκταις ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγὼν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τοῖς

δ' ἀξιοῦσι στεφανοῦσθαι πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρετήν, Isokr. 7. 73: πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων ἀρετὴν ἀμιλλητέον ἡμῖν ἐστι, Lys. 3. 40: φιλονικεῖν, Isokr. 4. 19, φιλονικία, Dem. 9. 14: ἔρις καὶ φιλονικία, Isokr. 4. 166: πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας, ἀμφισβητεῖν (*cf.* Lykourg. 108), Isai. 7. 2 and 21: ἀμφισβητεῖν, Lys. 17. 5: ἀμφισβήτησιν ποιεῖσθαι, Andok. 2. 26: ὁ πρόπαππος στασιάσας πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου, Lys. 25. 22: στασιάζειν, Isokr. 4. 79: στάσεις ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. In Isokr. 3. 18: διὰ τὰς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς φιλοτιμίας, the idea is rivalry in ambitious hopes and projects: the ordinary force of φιλοτιμία πρός τινα in the orators is quite different. Here belongs, as finding its justification in the suggestion of conflict, the use of πρός with κινδυνεύειν and κίνδυνος. As κίνδυνος runs very close at times to μάχη in signification, if it does not quite reach it, it seems not unnatural to suppose that μάχεσθαι πρός τινα led to the adoption of κινδυνεύειν πρός τινα, which in turn opened the door for κινδύνους ποιεῖσθαι πρός τινα. Lys. 16. 18: τῶν κινδυνεύειν ἐθελόντων πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, Isokr. 4. 67: διακινδυνεύειν, Isokr. 4. 135: κινδυνεύειν, Isokr. 12. 83: κινδυνεύειν, Isokr. 17. 2: κινδυνεύειν, Dem. 15. 24: κινδυνεύειν, Deinarch. 2. 26: κινδυνεύειν, Dem. 50. 21: κινδύνους κινδυνεύειν πρός τε χειμῶνα καὶ πρὸς πολεμίους, Isokr. 4. 173: τοὺς κινδύνους πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ποιησώμεθα, Isokr. 6. 42: κινδύνους ποιεῖσθαι, Dem. 48. 29: κίνδυνον ποιεῖσθαι, Isokr. 12. 61: τῶν κινδύνων τῶν ἅμα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς γενομένων, Lys. 16. 12: τοὺς κινδύνους τοὺς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, Isokr. 4. 65: τῶν πρὸς Εὐρυσθέα κινδύνων, Lykourg. 130: κίνδυνος, Lys. 19. 20: πολλῶν κινδύνων ὑπαρχόντων πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους. In Isokr. 4. 26 we read: εὑρήσομεν γὰρ αὐτὴν (τὴν πόλιν) τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον κινδύνων αἰτίαν οὖσαν, where τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον κινδύνων (*cf.* Isokr. 4. 142) is a general expression, 'dangers incurred in war.' Of course, we have not in these words precisely the same construction in all respects as is exemplified above in such phrases as τοὺς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους

κινδύνους; but, whatever the degree of difference may be, it is the offspring and natural extension of just these uses; it required but a slight change to substitute τὸν πόλεμον, used, perhaps, at first of a particular war, actually waged, for τοὺς πολεμίους; that is, of the notion of opposition made for that of opponents. After this the generalization would be as natural as in the case of οἱ πολέμιοι. Other more indefinite senses of πρός, 'in the way of,' 'with a view to,' 'with regard to,' would lend their aid in the development, and the sense in the end would probably be much the same as in the phrase τὴν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιστήμην, which is found in Lys. 33. 7.

Partaking of the character of both the preceding classes are the legal uses of the construction, in which the orators, from the prevailing character of their orations, so much abound: *cf.* πράγματα of legal proceedings on the one side, and ἀγωνίζεσθαι, of 'fighting' one's case in the courts on the other. Dem. 18. 16: ἀγωνίζεσθαι, Lys. 19. 11: ἀγών, Isokr. 14. 3: ἀγών, Dem. 43. 1: ἀγών, Lys. 17. 5: ἀντιδικῶν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, Isai. 11. 9: ἀντιδικεῖν, Isai. 5. 31: τῆν πρὸς Λεωχάρην δίκης, Dem. 27. 26: πρὸς τὴν δίκην ἥττηνται περὶ αὐτῶν, Dem. 29. 1: πρότερόν μοι δίκης γενομένης πρὸς Ἀφοβον, Dem. 37. 2: δίκη, Dem. 45. 64: δίκη, Dem. [7]. 41: πρὸς Καρδιανοὺς δεῖ ὑμᾶς διαδικάζεσθαι, Aisch. 3. 146: διαδικασίαν ἔφη γράψειν τῷ βήματι πρὸς τὸ στρατήγιον, Isai. 8. 3: τὴν κρίσιν οὐ δεῖ μοι νομίζειν, εἶναι πρὸς τὸν εἰληχότα του κλήρου, τὴν δίκην, Deinarch. 1. 87: κρίσει Ποσειδῶν ἀποτοχὼν τοῖς ὑπὲρ Ἁλιρροθίου πρὸς Ἄρη γενομένοις ἐνέμεινεν · αὗται αἱ σεμναὶ θεαὶ τῇ πρὸς Ὀρέστην κρίσει, Isai. 11. 27: λαχεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους, ibid.: τῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ λήξεως, Dem. 45. 41: ὅταν εἰσίω πρὸς τοὺς ταῦτα μεμαρτυρηκότας, Dem. 37. 1: πρὸς Πανταίνετον παρεγραψάμην, Dem. 45. 40: παραγράφεσθαι. In Dem. 33. 23: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτροπὴ τούτῳ πρὸς Παρμένοντα τρίτον ἔτος γέγονε we have the legal πρός, but under somewhat peculiar circumstances, for this ἐπιτροπή is a joint act of both the parties to the

suit, who here are οὗτος and Παρμένων, and not an act by one of them as against the other, *cf.* § 14: πεισθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων εἰς ἐπιτροπὴν ἔρχονται, καὶ γράψαντες συνθήκας ἐπιτρέπουσιν ἐνὶ μὲν διαιτητῇ κ.τ.λ. It is the implication in ἐπιτροπὴ of this agreement *between* them so to refer the points in dispute, and that solely, that makes πρός here a possible construction. In this instance, πρός has come in through the door of 'business relations.'—Connected with these expressions for instituting proceedings at law are words of accusation, first in a legal and then in a general sense; no attempt is here made to separate the two senses. Isokr. 4. 68: πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐγκλήματα ποιησάμενοι, Dem. 36. 14: ἔγκλημα ποιεῖσθαι, Dem. 18. 151: ἐγκλήματα καὶ πόλεμος πρὸς τοὺς Ἀμφισσέας ἐταράχθη, Dem. 37. 18: ἔγκλημα εἶναί τινι πρός τινα, Dem. 41. 4: τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐγκλημάτων, Isokr. 18. 41: τῶν κατηγοριῶν αἷς ἔξεστι χρῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς μηδέν ἡμαρτηκότας, Isokr. 11. 40: περὶ τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κακηγορίας (mutual).

Another use of πρός in legal phraseology is to indicate the court or magistrate before whom suit is brought, or definite acts pertaining to the suit are performed. Such an instance as Dem. 34. 1: οὐδεμίαν πώποτε δίκην πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰσῆλθον probably shows how this usage arose, and the idea that the preposition in such cases conveyed, however indistinctly, to the mind of a Greek. Lys. 17. 8: πρὸς οὓς αἱ δίκαι ἐλήχθησαν, Lys. 23. 4: τῶν λαχόντων αὐτῷ δίκας πρὸς τὸν πολέμαρχον, Isai. 11. 33: λαχέτω πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα, Lys. 26. 14: ἔστι δὲ τούτοις πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀγών, Lys. 32. 2: ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν πρὸς τούτους (*sc.* τοὺς δικαστάς) ἐγκλημάτων, Andok. 1. 73: ἐγγυὰς ἠγγυήσαντο πρὸς τὸ δημόσιον, Isokr. 17. 14: διεγγυῶντος Μενεξένου πρὸς τὸν πολέμαρχον τὸν παῖδα, Aisch. 3. 20: ἐγγράφειν πρὸς τοὺς λογιστάς, Dem. 37. 6: αἴτιον ἑαυτῷ πρὸς τὸ δημόσιον γενέσθαι τῆς ἐγγραφῆς, Isai. 6. 44: πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα ἀπέγραψαν αὐτούς, Isokr. 18. 6: πρὸς αὐτὸν (*sc.* τὸν ἄρχοντα) τὴν φάσιν τῶν χρημάτων

ἐποιεῖτο, Dem. 27. 51 : κελεύοντος δ' ἐμοῦ πρὸς τὸν διαιτητὴν ἐπιδεικνύναι ταῦτα.

We have already noticed in other connections how πρός, after its use with expressions of specific signification, had become naturalized and thoroughly habitual, acquired the power to denote the same specific relations with other words that certainly admitted them, sometimes suggested them, but did not directly express them; at times, indeed, all the suggestion that was needed was given by the general trend of the context. or the general region in which the thought of the passage found its natural habitat. The same remark falls to be made as to the denotation of hostility and of dealings at law. In Isokr. 5. 122 : ἀποχρησάμενον τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, although ἀποχρήσασθαι is a verb of the most general character, the unmistakeable sense is 'use against,' 'use in war against.' The general sense of the passage, which is an exhortation to Philip to turn his attention to the war with Persia Isokrates was so fond of preaching, puts this limitation upon the meaning of πρός just as completely as if he had said in so many words ἀποχρησάμενον τοῖς τοιούτοις εἰς πόλεμον πρὸς τ. β. *cf.* Isokr. 12. 219 : ὅσοι τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς εὑρημένοις ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ, τούτοις ἐπὶ βλάβῃ χρώμενοι τυγχάνουσι μὴ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους μηδὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας μηδὲ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν χώραν εἰσβάλλοντας, where the words ἐπὶ βλάβῃ specialize the sense of the participle χρώμενοι to that of hostile, harmful use. It is to be remarked, however, that even here these words would doubtless have been omitted had it not been for the ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ that precedes, since the whole context, and especially the words τοὺς—εἰσβάλλοντας make it quite clear that by τοῖς πράγμασι are meant what are called a line or two further on τοῖς περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιτηδεύμασιν. *cf.* also Isokr. 4. 174 : εἰ ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις ταῖς ἐκ τούτων (*sc.* τῶν κινδύνων τῶν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς) γεγενημέναις πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον καταχρήσασθαι δόξειεν ἡμῖν. In the legal sphere a remarkable

instance has been quoted above, Dem. 33. 23; another may be found in Dem. 39. 15: *εἴ τις δίκην ἐξούλης αὐτῷ λαχὼν μηδὲν ἐμοὶ φαίη πρὸς αὐτὸν εἶναι, κυρίαν δὲ ποιησάμενος ἐγγράψαι, τί μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη τοῦτον ἢ ἐμὲ ἐγγραφώς.* This is just as clear as if he had said *μὴ ἐμοὶ φαίη ταύτην πρὸς αὐτὸν εἶναι*, since the definiteness that would thus be given by *ταύτην* to the application of *πρός* has ceased to be necessary: what is wanted in this respect may be gathered from the context. In the category of international dealings and relations an example is furnished us of this extension of the force of *πρός* in Isokr. 5. 15. After speaking of Philip as *πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν κεκτημένον ὅσην οὐδεὶς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἃ μόνα τῶν ὄντων καὶ πείθειν καὶ βιάζεσθαι πέφυκεν · ὧν οἶμαι καὶ τὰ ῥηθησόμενα προσδεήσεσθαι*, the writer adds: *μέλλω γάρ σοι συμβουλεύειν προστῆναι τῆς τε τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁμονοίας καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους στρατείας · ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν πείθειν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας συμφέρον, τὸ δὲ βιάζεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους χρήσιμον.* Philip, he says, by his wealth and power, has the ability both to persuade and to constrain, both of which the project to be proposed will call for; this project is nothing less than the union of Greece under Philip's presidency and a joint attack upon Persia, and his ability to persuade will be helpful in his dealings and negotiations with the Greeks, as his military force will be useful in the campaign against the barbarians. One may render *πρός* here in both cases, if one wishes, 'as regards,' or by any other suitable general phrase, but none the less it will denote clearly in the one case the sort of dealings implied in *προστῆναι τῆς ὁμονοίας* in the one case, and in *στρατείας* in the other. Placed in different connection and in a different atmosphere of thought, *πρός* in the two cases would change its sense to suit. The extreme instances of this development of *πρός* in the denotation of dealings, intercourse and relations are found in the frequent phrases *τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς*, *τὰ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν*, *τὰ πρὸς ἐμέ*, etc., etc.

Very interesting is the fact, frequently illustrated in the examples already given, that out of the concrete expression of the action of a definite person by means of a verb, arises the abstract expression of action (of a specified or unspecified person) by means of the corresponding noun, and that, as this construction with πρός is used in the one case, so it is also in the other. Such a process, easy and natural enough in itself, may have been facilitated by the possibility of periphrasis afforded by the use of ποιεῖσθαι, or some similar word, with the proper verbal noun. We may not only say λέγειν πρός τινα, but λόγους ποιεῖσθαι πρός τινα, λόγῳ χρῆσθαι πρός τινα and λόγος πρός τινα; ἀγωνίζομαι πρός τινα through ἀγὼν γίγνεταί μοι πρός τινα leads to ἀγὼν πρός τινα; similarly we find κινδυνεύειν πρός τινα, κίνδυνον ποιεῖσθαι πρός τινα, and ultimately κίνδυνος πρός τινα. It is worth noticing, too, that expressions of this sort were found capable of large extension, especially in words of relation rather than of action, so that, in some cases, the construction came to be possible with the noun, although the corresponding verb did not admit of it. We may not say φιλεῖν πρός τινα, but we may and do say φιλίαν ποιεῖσθαι πρός τινα and φιλία πρός τινα.

Cognate with this, carried along by it and helping in turn to carry it along, is a modification of the force of πρός when used with verbs and expressions of action; a modification that runs through all the categories and not seldom alters the meaning. Throwing off the restriction to the signification of action of one person upon a second, when both are in actual presence the one of the other, it takes the more abstract sense of direction of activity towards. This has three important results: *first*, it opens the way to what I may call a secondary direction of activity, which may be simultaneous with a quite different primary direction of the same activity; our words, for example, may be spoken to, and in the hearing of, one person while meant for another who perhaps may not be there to hear them

spoken; *second*, it makes it possible to use words, which primarily can only express action personal at once in subject and object, to denote action secondarily directed towards things and events; *third*, it permits extension of this construction to a wider circle of verbs.

As instances of the first take the following: Dem. 18. 40: *σαφῶς δηλοῖ καὶ διορίζεται ἐν τῇ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐπιστολῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ συμμάχους*, Dem. 18. 196: *ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα πάντα πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὦ δικασταί* (the persons addressed) *καὶ τοὺς περιεστηκότας καὶ ἀκροωμένους* (persons not addressed, but welcome hearers), *ἐπεὶ πρός γε τοῦτον* (person not addressed, nor thought of as listening; but yet 'le discours est à son addresse,' is meant for him) *βραχὺς καὶ σαφὴς ἐξήρκει λόγος*; of the second: Aisch. 3. 17: *πρὸς τὸν ἄφυκτον λόγον βραχέα βούλομαι προειπεῖν*; of the third: Dem. 27. 8: *οὐδ' αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἀποκρύψασθαι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἐδυνήθησαν*. Isokr. 4. 82: *πρὸς δὲ τοὺς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἁρμόττοντες λόγοι*, Isai. 11. 30: *πρὸς ὃν μὴ ὅτι γένος εἶχον ἄμεινον εἰπεῖν*, Aisch. 3. 236: *ἡδέως ἂν ἐναντίον ὑμῶν ἀναλογισαίμην πρὸς τὸν γράψαντα τὸ ψήφισμα*, Dem. 33. 8: *ἀνθαπολογησάμενος πρὸς τοῦτον*, Dem. 22. 19: *ὅτι δεῖ πρόφασιν πιθανὴν ἔξευρεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς*, Dem. 23. 123: *εὐεργεσίας πρόφασις πρὸς ὑμᾶς*, Isokr. 18. 30: *τίνας πίστεις πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους εὑρήσομεν*, Ant. Bγ 2: *ἕνα πρὸς ἕνα λόγον ἀπολογηθείς*, Lys. 19. 11: *ἀπολογεῖσθαι πρὸς δόξαν ἣν ἔνιοι ἔχουσι*, Lys. 19. 51: *πρὸς διαβολὴν ἀπολογεῖσθαι*, Lys. 26. 4: *πρὸς τούτους τοὺς λόγους ἀντειπεῖν*, Isai. 2. 17: *πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν ἀντειπεῖν*, Isai. 10. 22: *πρὸς νόμους καὶ δίκαιον πρᾶγμα ἀντιλέγειν*, Dem. 45. 44: *πρὸς τὸν λόγον τοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἀναίδειαν προειπεῖν ὑμῖν*, Aisch. 3. 205: *ἀπολογεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸν τῶν ὑπευθύνων νόμον, πρὸς τὸ παράνομον ἀπολογεῖσθαι*, Aisch. 2. 11: *πρὸς τόλμαν καὶ τερατείαν διαμνημονεῦσαι, λέγειν πρὸς ἀπροσδοκήτους διαβολάς*, Isai. 3. 79: *πρὸς τὴν τούτου μαρτυρίαν τεκμήριόν ἐστι τοῦτο*, Dem. 54. 26: *γράφοντας μαρτυρίας οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα*, Aisch. 3. 203: *τὰς ἐσομένας πρὸς ταῦτα προφάσεις*, Dem. 19. 310: *ἐνθυμεῖσθε πρὸς μὲν τὰ*

τούτου παιδία, πρὸς δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ τούτου δάκρυα, Dem. 20. 146: πρός τινας ὑπολαμβάνειν ('have opinion of'), Aisch. 2. 176: μνησικακεῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, Isai. 11. 9: ἀμφισβητεῖν πρὸς διαθήκας, Isokr. 4. 188: πρὸς τὸν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἄμιλλαν, Isokr. 18. 31: πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον καλῶς ἀγωνίζεσθαι, Dem. 30. 3: πρὸς παρασκευὰς λόγων καὶ μάρτυρας ὁ ἀγών ἐστιν, Deinarch. 3. 20: διαδικάζεται πρὸς τὴν πονηρίαν, Dem. 35. 32: πρὸς τὸ πλοῖον οὐδὲν ἦν αὐτοῖς συμβόλαιον, Aisch. 2. 38: διατριβὴν ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς λόγους τινάς, Isokr. 1. 37: μηδενὶ χρῶ πονηρῷ πρὸς τὰς διοικήσεις, Isokr. 15. 193: πρὸς ὑμᾶς συστέλλειν τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν, Dem. 15. 96: πρός τινας ὑποστέλλεσθαι, Deinarch. 3. 13: ὑποστέλλεσθαι, Aisch. 1. 115: πρὸς Φιλόξενον ἀνήλωσε, Isokr. 15. 140: οὐκ ἀποκρύψομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, Dem. 45. 58: πρὸς μαρτυρίαν τινά, ἵν' ἐξορκώσαιμι, ἀναστάντος ἐμοῦ, Isokr. 9. 69: τὰς παρασκευὰς τὰς πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους. Here falls to be placed Dem. 52. 24: οἶμαί τί μοι καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι πρὸς τὴν ἀλαζονείαν τὴν τούτου: the speaker has just promised to prove a certain fact, when he adds these words: 'I think that in this I will score a point of importance against,' πρός indicating the 'bearing' the promised proof will have. A somewhat similar case is found in Dem. 37. 57: ἀλλὰ τί τούτων ἐμοὶ πρὸς σέ, Πανταίνετε; these words follow a mention of certain outward defects in speech and action, which the opponent had harped upon in the hope of prejudicing the jury, and the point that is made is that such matters have no bearing upon the case as between the speaker and Pantainetos, that these unfortunate peculiarities of his have never wrought harm to Pantainetos in their business transactions; the rhetorical question that follows, πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπονθας, must not be left out of sight in considering the meaning of this passage.

Out of this use of πρός grows the general and indefinite sense, so often met with, 'in reference to,' 'with a view to,' 'with regard to.' This again receives specific application in two directions: either the events with a view to which

action is taken are future, and then they supply the purpose of the action; or these events precede, and then they mark the occasion for the action. Of the indefinite sense the following are examples: Lys. 26. 24: *πρὸς ταῦτα βουλεύεσθαι*, Isokr. 1. 28: *πρὸς τὸν ἄλλον βίον μετρίως αὐτὴν ἀγάπα*, Isokr. 9. 46: *τῇ πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους εὐβουλίᾳ*, Dem. 36. 31: *εἰ πρὸς γένους δόξαν ἀναίνει Φορμίωνα κηδεστήν*, Aisch. 2. 3: *ἀπίθανος ὢν πρὸς τὴν ὑποψίαν ταύτην* ('untrustworthy as regards, in the matter of, such a suggestion of suspicion'), Aisch. 2. 165: *πρὸς τὸ παρὸν τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν*, Lykourg. 69: *πρὸς τὸν ἐπιόντα κίνδυνον καλῶς βουλευσάμενον*, Lys. 33. 7: *τὴν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιστήμην*. In the particular sense of purpose we have: Lys. 9. 15: *προφάσεως οὐδεμιᾶς πρὸς ἔχθραν ὑπαρχούσης*, Lys. 19. 22: *προσδεῖν πρὸς τὸν μισθὸν τοῖς πελτασταῖς*, Isokr. 4. 40: *τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς πρὸς ἡδονὴν μεμηχανημένας* (*cf.* the frequent phrases *πρὸς ἡδονὴν λέγειν*, *πρὸς χάριν λέγειν*), Isokr. 4. 47: *φιλοσοφία ἣ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις ἡμᾶς ἐπαίδευσε*, Isokr. 5. 25: *ὑπειλήφασι τοὺς μὲν (τῶν λόγων) πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν καὶ πρὸς ἐργολαβίαν* (*cf.* 12. 271 and 15. 1), Isokr. 13. 5: *πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν εὖ βουλευόμενοι*, Isokr. 15. 183: *τὰ σχήματα τά πρὸς ἀγωνίαν εὑρημένα*, Dem. 23. 199: *Μένωνι δώδεκα τάλαντα δόντι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον*, Dem. 49. 5: *ἵν' ᾖ αὐτοῖς γνώριμα τά τε ληφθέντα καὶ τὰ τεθέντα πρὸς τοὺς λογισμούς* ('against the audit'). In the sense of occasion we have: Isokr. 15. 175: *τοὺς μὲν διαβεβλημένους πρὸς αὐτήν* (*sc.* *τὴν φιλοσοφίαν*), *i.e.* 'by reason of,' on account of,' Dem. 23. 177: *λαβὲ τὸ ψήφισμα ἃ πρὸς ταῦθ' ὑμεῖς ἐψηφίσασθε*. Here belongs *πρὸς ταῦτα* = 'therefore.'

The notion of activity directed towards an object easily passes into that of attitude assumed or held toward it. Where persons are concerned, attitude may be external or internal, it may imply the actuality or the possibility, as manifested by outward and visible tokens, of a certain course of action, or nothing more than the disposition or frame of mind that lies behind such an attitude. Moreover

such a disposition may, as regards its nature, either be a thing of the emotions, as generally between persons, or a certain adaptation of powers intellectual or physical, a capacity of some sort, as mostly between persons and pursuits, modes of life, lines of action. Where persons are not concerned, or not directly concerned, except as they are implied in the qualities and states that belong to them, the resultant notion will be that of adaptability, helpfulness, suitableness. It is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a line between attitude (externally manifested, but not yet active) and disposition in citing examples, nor is it easily possible either to draw a firmer line between the disposition of emotion and that of capacity; for the same words are constantly used in all these cases, a fact which, while it causes this difficulty, at the same renders it a matter of little importance, by showing us that no syntactic advantage is to be gained by attempting any differentiation. An exception should be made to this last statement as regards adjectives. To judge from the practice of the orators, and this, I think, is a fair basis for judgment, adjectives which denote suitableness or capacity, intellectual or physical, natural or acquired, are frequently construed with πρός and the accusative, whereas adjectives of the emotions (φίλος, ἐχθρός and the like), which are inspired by, and felt towards, persons, are very rarely so construed, and this, although the corresponding nouns are quite frequent with πρὸς. To these nouns allusion has already been made; and the fact here stated makes it all the more probable that φιλία πρός τινα, which has no sufficient basis in φίλος any more than it has in φιλεῖν, is due to φιλίαν ποιεῖσθαι πρός τινα, where the verb ποιεῖσθαι has made the construction possible.

I. OF THE ATTITUDE OF PERSONS.

This construction is an everyday matter, with the verbs of disposition or attitude, διακεῖσθαι, ἔχειν, πεφυκέναι, an adverb (with πεφυκέναι an adjective may be used, as with εἶναι) being added to describe the position or attitude:

διακεῖσθαι: of disposition towards persons: Lys. 3. 4: ἀνοητότερον, Isokr. 12. 48: οἰκειότατα, Isokr. 16. 15: πιστῶς, Dem. 53. 14: οἰκείως. Towards things: Isokr. 14. 36: κοσμιώτερον, Isokr. 9. 5: φιλοτιμοτέρως, Lykourg. 4. 8: καταδεέστερον.

ἔχειν: towards persons: Isai. 7. 8: ἐχθρῶς, Isokr. 11. 3: εὐνοικῶς, Isokr. 19. 47: καλῶς, Dem. 52. 29: οὕτως, Lykourg. 15: εὐσεβῶς, ὁσίως, φιλοτίμως, Isokr. 9. 58: περιδεῶς, Dem. 54. 42: οὕτως. Towards things: Isokr. 16. 5: ἐρρωμένως, Deinarch. 3. 14: παρέργως, Lykourg. 104: οὕτως, Aisch. 1. 167: ὀλιγώρως.

πεφυκέναι: towards things: Isokr. 15. 187: καλῶς, Isokr. 15. 274: κακῶς, Lykourg. 132: μάλιστα, Lys. 19. 1: δεινός.

Some verbs both indicate a disposition and describe it without need of an adverb: φιλοτιμεῖσθαι: Lys. 29. 14, Dem. 21. 17, Aisch. 2. 106; all of relation towards persons. Isokr. 4. 47: φιλοσοφίαν ἢ ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπράϋνε, Dem. 23. 12: πολῖται γεγενημένοι καὶ ἄλλως ἐσπουδακότες πρὸς ὑμᾶς.

The disposition may be both indicated and described by an adverb: Isokr. 4. 41: τὴν διοίκησιν οὕτω φιλοξένως κατεσκεύασατο καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας οἰκείως, Isokr. 12. 48: πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀλλοτρίως καὶ πολεμικῶς τὴν αὑτῶν διοικοῦντες.

The disposition or attitude may be given and described by an adjective: towards persons: Lys. 21. 10: παρεσκευασάμην τὸ πλήρωμα πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀκόλουθον, Isokr. 3. 34: πρὸς δὲ τοὺς δίκαιον ἐμαυτὸν παρέχων, Dem. 21. 101: μέτριος, Isokr. 1. 30: ὁμιλητικός, Isokr. 1. 31: φιλόνικος, Isokr. 4.

106: ἄπειροι κινδύνων, ἐλεύθεροι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, ἀστασίαστοι δὲ πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτούς, εἰρήνην ἄγοντες πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους (*cf.* 4. 150), Lys. 30. 26: ἀγαθὸς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, Dem. 23. 154: ἀφυλάκτων ὄντων ὡς ἂν πρὸς φίλον τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, Dem. 19. 206: δειλός, Dem. 23. 150: ἐχθρός; here belongs Dem. 19. 27: ἄπιστος, Dem. 37. 54: τίς ἐγὼ πρὸς τοὺς συμβάλλοντας ἄνθρωπος καὶ πρὸς τοὺς δεομένους εἰμί, since the answer to the question would necessarily be μέτριος, or some such adjective.

Towards things: Isokr. 2. 22: τοῖς ξένοις τὴν πόλιν πάρεχε πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια νόμιμον, Aisch. 1. 1: μέτριον ἐμαυτὸν πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων παρεσχηκώς, Isokr. 12. 32: τοὺς πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα τὴν ἕξιν τῆς ψυχῆς εὐάρμοστον ἔχοντας, Isokr. 4. 150: ὄχλος κινδύνων ἄπειρος, πρὸς μὲν τὸν πόλεμον ἐκλελυμένος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν δουλείαν ἄμεινον πεπαιδευμένος (*cf.* 4. 106, above), Lykourg. 9. 82: ἀγαθὸς πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον (*cf.* Lys. 30. 23, above), Aisch. 3. 152: ἀχρηστότατος, θαυμασιώτατος, Isokr. 5. 18: καταδεέστερον, Isokr. 5. 81: ἀφυέστατος, Isokr. 15. 131: ἀφυής, Isokr. 7. 74: εὐφυέστατος, διαφέρων (see below), Isokr. 15. 267: εὐμαθέστερος, Lys. 19. 1: δεινός, Isokr. 9. 20: δεινός, Isokr. 3. 56: ταπεινός, Isokr. 10. 39: ταπεινός.

Noun of attitude depending upon ἔχειν or ἄγειν: Isokr. 7. 51: πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἡσυχίαν εἶχον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας εἰρήνην ἦγον (*cf.* Isokr. 4. 106, above).

Noun of disposition depending on ἔχειν, with attributive adjective: Dem. 19. 222: ἔχθραν πατρικὴν ἔχουσι πρός με.

With predicative adjective: Isokr. 4. 57: ἀείμνηστον τὴν ὀργήν, Isokr. 4. 174: τὰς εὐνοίας ἀληθινάς (similar in effect is Dem. 54. 42: οὕτως τὴν ὀργὴν ἔχειν πρός τινα, though by reason of the adverb οὕτως this belongs above.)

Noun with συμβαίνειν, γίγνεσθαι, ὑπάρχειν, εἶναι: ἀπέχθεια: Dem. 19. 17, 19. 221: ἔχθρα: Dem. 19. 34, Dem. 54. 6, Lys. 12. 2, Lys. 18. 5, Isokr. 5. 42, Isokr. 14. 32,

Isokr. 19. 32, Isai. 7. 27; ὀργή: Dem. 54. 6; φιλία; Isokr. 15. 101, Isai. 7. 29, Andok. 1, 141: ξενίαι καὶ φιλότητες: πίστις: Deinarch. 3. 18; φιλοτιμία: Dem. 20. 69, Dem. 59. 33 (with ποιεῖσθαι); οἰκειότης: Dem. 19. 22; σπουδή: Lys. 8. 1.

Noun without verb: ἀπέχθεια: Dem. 18. 31, Dem. 19, 12, Aisch. 2. 105; ἔχθρα: Dem. 18. 163, Dem. 58. 4, Aisch. 3. 217, Aisch. 2. 140, Isokr. 4. 15, Isokr. 4. 73, Isokr. 7. 8; ὀργή: Dem. 40. 29, Lys. 25. 5, Isokr. 15. 139; ἀηδία: Dem. 19. 193: μανία: Isokr. 12. 14; ὑποψία: Dem. 48. 18; φόβος: Dem. 16. 10; ὁμόνοια: Isokr. 4. 3, Deinarch. 3. 19; φιλία: Dem. 33. 24, Isokr. 9. 57, Isokr. 14. 33, Isokr. 16. 28, Isokr. 19. 41, Deinarch. 1. 19, Lykourg. 1. 35; εὔνοια: Lys. 18. 3, Aisch. 1. 159, Aisch. 2. 118, Isokr. 3. 61: πίστις: Lys. 12. 67, Aisch. 1. 132, Deinarch. 3. 10; ἀπιστία: Aisch. 1. 161; φιλοτιμία: Dem. 19. 173, Aisch. 3. 212, Aisch. 3. 19; χάρις: Deinarch. 3. 21. Dem. 54, 36: ἑτοιμότης ὅση καὶ οἵα πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν ὅτι οὖν ὑπάρχει.

II. OF SUITABILITY, HELPFULNESS, ETC.

Aisch. 1. 41: ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, Isokr. 1. 10: ἡγεῖτο εἶναι πρὸς ἑταιρίαν πολλῷ κρείττω φύσιν νόμου, Isokr. 4. 40: τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τοῦ βίου χρησίμας, Isokr. 15. 263: χρησίμην εἶναι τὴν παιδείαν πρὸς τὰς πράξεις, Isokr. 6. 76: τοὺς τόπους τοὺς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον συμφέροντας, Isokr. 8. 31: συμφέρων, Isokr. 7. 44: πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν ἥρμοττεν, Isokr. 15. 10: ἁρμόττων, Isokr. 21. 11: τεκμήριον πρὸς ἅπαντα ἱκανόν, Isokr. 12. 9: τὴν φύσιν εἰδὼς πρὸς τὰς πράξεις ἀρρωστοτέραν καὶ μαλακωτέραν, Isokr. 7. 30: εὐκαίρως συνέβαινεν πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν τῆς χώρας.

Under this head must be put the use with διαφέρειν, frequent in Isokrates, to denote superior capacity for something, or superiority of capacity in a given direction. Isokr. 3. 17: ὅσον αἱ μοναρχίαι πρὸς τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέ-

ρουσιν, Isokr. 4. 53: ὅσον διαφέρουσι αἱ μείζους τῶν συμμαχιῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, Isokr. 4. 72: πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς κινδύνους διενεγκόντες ('superior in encountering'), Isokr. 6, 4: οὐ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἐτῶν πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν εὖ διαφέρομεν ἀλλήλων, Isokr. 11. 17: πρὸς τὰς τέχνας εὑρήσομεν αὐτοὺς πλέον διαφέροντας τῶν περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἐπιστήμας.

There are two passages, one in Isokrates and the other in Aischines, that call for something more than registration: examination and, if possible, explanation is needed. Isokr. 2. 42: τὰ συμβουλεύοντα καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ τῶν συγγραμμάτων χρησιμώτατα μὲν ἅπαντες νομίζουσιν, οὐ μὴν ἥδιστά γ' ἀκούουσιν, ἀλλὰ πεπόνθασιν ὅπερ πρὸς τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας· καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνους ἐπαινοῦσι μέν, πλησιάζειν δὲ βούλονται τοῖς συνεξαμαρτάνουσιν ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἀποτρέπουσιν. Aisch. 3. 144: καὶ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἐγὼ μὲν κατηγορῶ ἕτεροι δὲ παραλείπουσιν, ἀλλὰ κἀγὼ λέγω καὶ πάντες ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ ὑμεῖς σύνιστε καὶ οὐκ ὀργίζεσθε . ἐκεῖνο γάρ πεπόνθατε πρὸς Δημοσθένην· συνείθισθε ἤδη τἀδικήματα αὐτοῦ ἀκούειν, ὥστε οὐ θαυμάζετε . δεῖ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἀγανακτεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι. The force of the πρὸς in these passages is something quite different from that of ὑπὸ with the genitive when construed with πάσχω, as may be seen on comparing Plat. Apol. 17 A: ὅτι ὑμεῖς πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγώ δ' οὖν ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. In this passage the πεπόνθατε denotes a condition of mind due to the action of the persuasive eloquence of the accusers. It is that eloquence that is insisted upon as productive of effect upon the subject of πεπόνθατε, and so these accusers are the *subject* of the explanatory phrase οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον; they are active, the hearers passive. But in the passages from Isokrates and Aischines these rôles are reversed: 'the moral instructors' in the one passage and Demosthenes (or rather his crimes, but the distinction is unimportant for our purposes) in the other are the *objects* of the

verbs in the explanatory phrases; not their action upon others, but the action or attitude of others towards them is the point to be made. It may be said that what is felt towards these by others is produced by their action upon those others; but even when this is the case, it can only be an inference from passages constructed like the above, it is not what they directly signify: the distinction is an important one in many cases; but in the passage from Aischines such an inference is even expressly excluded, for he does not say, 'Demosthenes has made you obtuse to his misdeeds,' but 'you have heard them so often spoken of by others that you have ceased to regard them.' We have here then no substitute of πρός with the accusative for ὑπὸ with the genitive, a case of which (though even then the sense is modified) I shall notice further on, nor a reversal of direction in the force of πρός, of which I shall also adduce several examples; but πρός is here used in a regular fashion that need give us no surprise and would not if we would only try to understand it. Now, shall we stop with rendering πρός 'towards,' and conclude that we have nothing here but a phrase similar to διακεῖσθαι πρός τινα? In Plato's Apol. 21c: ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, it is impossible to take πρός as having no more force than it would have with the words οὕτω πως διετέθην, although the τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον is 'a feeling of this sort came over me,' and although, as in the cases given above, the continuation is: καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφός—εἶναι δ' οὔ; which expresses most decidedly a feeling towards him and an opinion of him. And the reason why this substitution is impossible is just the presence of σκοπῶν, which is not merely 'in my investigation,' but a repetition in abbreviated form of the διασκοπῶν τοῦτον that immediately precedes, so that, though we may say in notes 'construe πρὸς ὃν with ἔπαθον,' we are compelled somehow, grammatically or

otherwise, to work σκοπῶν into the connection as well. Let us now look at another passage in Plato. Gorg. 485 B–D: ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ψελλιζομένους. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίον ἴδω ᾧ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω ψελλιζόμενον, χαίρω· ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγομένου παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρόν τί μοι δοκεῖ χρῆμα εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις ψελλιζομένου ἢ παίζοντα ὁρᾷ, καταγέλαστον φαίνεται καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. ταὐτὸν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας. παρὰ νέῳ μὲν γὰρ μειρακίῳ ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι· ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ. Here again πάσχω πρός τινα appears with similar explanatory phrases, expressing the speaker's opinion of or feeling towards the φιλοσοφοῦντες; and it would seem easy enough here to regard πάσχω πρός as quite parallel as to the force of the preposition with διακεῖμαι πρός; but yet one cannot help feeling that, if πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας amounted to no more than this, the extended explanation that follows might have dispensed with its ὅταν ἴδω, ὅταν ἀκούσω, παρὰ νέῳ—ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν, etc. Why not simply say: 'the lisping child is a pleasure to me,' 'the man who lisps ought, in my opinion, to get a thrashing'? If this seem like hair-splitting, and the freedom of choice an author is supposed to have in his mode of expression be brought forward to account for the introduction of these words, I might say that in Greek writing which appealed so much more to the ear and less to the eye than does our literary tongue (*cf.* the passage from Isokrates now under discussion), a form of expression once entered upon was very likely to be kept up and the development of an idea already succinctly expressed was very likely to be made through the development on a larger scale of the form of expression first chosen. But, apart from any such general consideration, it is remarkable that in all these examples we have, closely connected with the

construction under discussion, such words as *ἀκούουσιν* (Isokr.), *ἀκούειν* (Aisch.), *σκοπῶν*, *διασκοπῶν*, *διαλεγόμενος* (Apol.), *ἴδω*, *ἀκούσω*, *ὁρῶν* (Gorg.): now, all this points in one direction and indicates one general force of *πρός*, which, however, takes color in each case from the particular circumstances of that case. In Isokrates the sense is 'when we hear them;' in Aischines, 'when they hear Demosthenes' (or 'his crimes,' for which the name is only a short cut) 'mentioned;' in the Apology, 'when I examined him and conversed with him;' in the Gorgias, 'when I saw,' etc.: the general sense being 'when they are brought before us' in the material world or, it may be, in the world of thought; and it is this vague relation indicated by *πρός* (the context giving it particularization) that gives rise to the 'feelings' in us rather than the persons themselves.

In all questions of business or personal dealings and relations, of attitude of persons towards others or even towards things, of dispositions, and especially of feelings towards persons, the idea of reciprocity is ever at hand to suggest itself. If A deals with B, B necessarily is not only dealt with by A, but deals with A; if A is at war with B, so is B with A; more, if A is friendly to B, we are quite ready to presume that B is friendly to A. It is a proverb with us that 'children love those that love them.' It is not surprising, therefore, that in expressions denoting such relations *πρός* with the accusative should distinctly imply a reverse relation of precisely the same sort. What we are not so readily prepared to expect is that, passing through this phase of mutuality of relation, it should ever come to express principally, if not solely, the reverse or reactionary side of the relation: yet such is the case.

I shall first give some examples to show that the sense of reciprocity of action or relation was to the feeling of the Greeks sufficiently near the surface to be distinctly felt, and then other examples, in which the return action or answering attitude is so far emphasized as at least to be

the most prominent idea expressed by the construction. I do this the more readily because I have never seen it distinctly stated, though I have long observed the use, and lately in various editions of the classics have seen it, as I think, misunderstood. I wish first of all to insist upon it, that what I am touching upon is reciprocal or responsive action precisely similar in kind to that which calls it forth, and not attitude based upon expectation of, and likely to result in, return of a different kind. In such cases the construction does not at all differ from those already considered, the implication being given, not by the *πρός*, but by the other word. Such expressions as *φιλοτιμεῖσθαι πρός τινα*, *φιλοτιμία πρός τινα* do not belong here, for, although we do read in Dem. 20. 82: *τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμίαν τοῦ πατρός*, and, a little further on, *καὶ μᾶλλον εἵλετο μὴ ζῆν ἢ καταισχῦναι τὰς παρ' ὑμῶν ὑπαρχούσας αὐτῷ τιμάς*; what the people render is not *φιλοτιμία*, but *τιμαί*, and the suggestion of this return is rather in the *φιλοτιμία* than in the *πρός*. This construction of *φιλοτιμεῖσθαι* and *φιλοτιμία* is so commonly cited as an illustration of cases which come properly under the present category and are of quite different import, therefore, as to show that this application of *πρός* has been little understood. Try to say *φιλοτιμία πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, and see what a difference comes necessarily over the sense of the noun (*cf.* Isokr. 3. 18: *τὰς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς φιλοτιμίας*, already quoted).

First, then, let me show that the Greeks did feel the suggestion of reciprocity contained in *πρός*, *i.e.*, that when using *πρός* with only one member of a relation, they felt the mutuality of the relation as completely at times as if *πρὸς ἀλλήλους* had been used. Dem. [7]. 41: *πρὸς Καρδιανοὺς δεῖ ὑμᾶς διαδικάζεσθαι εἴ τι πρὸς αὐτοὺς διαφερεσθε. διαφέρονται δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, σκεψασθε εἰ περὶ μικροῦ*: here the feeling of action and respondent reaction is exceedingly clear. In English we would be compelled to say:

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'If you have any dispute with them, but you have a dispute with them;' we could not say as the Greek puts it: 'If you have a dispute with them, but they have a dispute with you.' Dem. 50. 28: *καὶ ἐγγυηταὶ αὐτοὶ (ἤθελον) γίγνεσθαι ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, ἢ μὴν ἔσεσθαι αὐτῷ ὅτι ἂν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τριηράρχοις πρὸς τοὺς διαδόχους ᾖ*; where *ἐγώ* is the trierarch and *αὐτός* his *διάδοχος* in that office; we would hardly say in English: 'My successor in office should be as fairly dealt with by me, as other trierarchs were by their successors in office,' or if we did, we should miss the meaning of the Greek. Isai. 7. 11: *αἱ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἔχθραι*, where it is distinctly added that it was unknown which of them was responsible for the enmity, and just above, in 7. 8, we read of the same persons *ἐχθρῶς ἔχοντες τὸν πάντα χρόνον διετέλεσαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους*. There can be no doubt that the words used in 7. 11 were felt to convey (and not merely imply or carry with them by way of suggestion) the same meaning as the more explicit phrase of 7. 8. It may be remarked here that the so frequent phrase *πρὸς ἀλλήλους* and its equivalent *πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτούς* must have contributed largely and potently to the development of this force in the preposition; but that this was only a contribution to a tendency already inherent, the other exemples show, and the traces of an incipient force of the kind that were above found in Homer but confirm this. Isokr. 1. 2: *ἀπέσταλκά σοι τόνδε τὸν λόγον δῶρον, τεκμήριον μὲν τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς εὐνοίας, σημεῖον δὲ τῆς πρὸς Ἱππόνικον συνηθείας*: *ἡμᾶς* in this sentence is, of course, Isokrates' usual substitute for *ἐμέ*, used to prevent hiatus. This *πρὸς ἡμᾶς* and the *πρὸς Ἱππόνικον* that follows mean precisely the same thing, 'between me and Hipponikos,' the change of expression being solely dictated by the desire of avoiding tautology, just as *τεκμήριον* in the one clause becomes *σημεῖον* in the second, without any stress being laid upon the difference between these synonyms. Such practical identity of signi-

fication could not have arisen, had not the reciprocal force of πρός been very strongly felt. The most remarkable example is yet to be given; it is found in Lys. 14. 2: πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῖν διαφορᾶς ὑπαρχούσης: 'Our fathers being already at loggerheads.' This has all the appearance of one of those colloquial short cuts, so common in all languages, in which, for the sake of brevity and pith of expression, logical exactness is thrown to the winds. It could only have been formed on the model of πρὸς ἀλλήλους and the πρός has here not merely the connotation of reciprocity of relation, but the positive denotation of interrelation; it gives us not one side in a given relation that is reciprocated, but both sides with the bond that unites them in the relation. With no help beyond that supplied by the number of πατέρας (a somewhat similar power of suggestion in a plural with πρός has already been noticed in Homer), the preposition has taken to itself the mutuality given to πρός ἀλλήλους by the pronoun. It is worth observing that in no other way could Lysias have conveyed all he desired to say in so few words or with such force. This is Lysias' boldest experiment in the use of πρός with the accusative, and it is not surprising that it seems to stand alone in the cultivated language of literature; it doubtless fell back into the region of colloquialism whence it must have sprung and where the orator found it.

But though it was felt that πρός (unaided by ἀλλήλους or some such word) was only suitable when one side of a relation was specified, this sense of the possible reciprocity of such relations, when πρός had acquired the power to convey it, gave rise to an occasional indifference to which side it was that was mentioned, where one was to be made specially prominent as source and the other as object of action or feeling. So that finally it became possible, as the following examples will show, to express thus not action directed towards some person or thing only, or even action and reaction looked upon as forming one reciprocating

whole, but the reverse or return action or feeling alone; that is, *πρός τινα* expressing a relation *towards*, comes, first, to express (as we have just seen) a reciprocated relation in terms of the person *towards* whom it exists, and, second, a like relation in terms of the *other* person concerned, *i.e.*, the person *towards* whom the *reaction*, but *from* whom the original action proceeds. Lys. 18. 6: *τοιαῦτα ἐνομίζετο τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ διὰ τοὺς προγόνους καὶ αὐτόν, ὥστε οὐκ ἄν ποθ' ἑτέρας ἐπιθυμῆσαι πολιτείας . συνήδεσαν γὰρ ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως τιμωμένοις, καὶ πολλαχοῦ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κεκινδυνευκόσι κ.τ.λ.* This example is on the fence; his relations and those of his ancestors *to* the state are explained first by the honors they had received *from* the state, and then by the services they had rendered *to* the state. Had the explanation stopped with *τιμωμένοις*, we would have been completely over the fence, as we are in the following instances. Lys. 13. 82: *τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας διέκειτο, οὐδεὶς γὰρ αὐτῷ διελέγετο.* In this case the second clause makes the nature of the relation clear; it is the attitude of the citizens to him, not his to them, that is important for the orator's purpose. Lys. 10. 22: *τίνος ὄντος ἐμοὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐγκλήματος*, 'what charge have you against me.' In this passage, overlooking this use of *πρός* with the accusative, Franke actually proposed to alter *ὑμᾶς* to *ὑμῶν*! Lys. 16. 10: *πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας οὕτω βεβίωκα ὥστε μηδεπώποτε μηδὲ πρὸς ἕνα μηδὲν ἔγκλημα γενέσθαι*, where *ἕνα* is evidently the person who is thought of as bringing the complaint. Dem. 1. 7.: *ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὑτοὺς ἐγκλημάτων μισοῦσι, βεβαίαν εἰκὸς τὴν ἔχθραν αὐτοὺς ὑμὲρ ὧν φοβοῦνται καὶ πεπόνθασιν ἔχειν; φοβοῦνται* and more particularly *πεπόνθασιν* make it impossible to regard *αὐτούς* as denoting any persons but those who make the complaint by reason of the treatment they have received. Isokr. 8. 38: *πότερα χρήσωμαι ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἢ κατασιωπήσω, δείσας τὴν πρὸς*

ὑμᾶς ἀπέχθειαν; 'your hostility to me' is the notion that worries the orator's mind. In every way similar to this is Dem. 6. 3: ἡμεῖς οἱ παριόντες τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπέχθειαν ὀκνοῦντες. Very clear is Dem. 14. 37: ἡσυχίαν μὲν γὰρ ἐχόντων ὑμῶν ὕποπτος ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτό τι πράττων, πόλεμον δὲ ποιησαμένων προτέρων εἰκότως ἂν δοκοίη διὰ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔχθραν τοῖς ἄλλοις φίλος εἶναι βούλεσθαι: the enmity unmistakably arises from the side of the Athenians. Dem. 19. 85: ὑμῖν μὲν τὴν ἔχθραν τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους μείζω, Φιλίππῳ δὲ τὴν χάριν πεποίηκεν: Aischines' action in the matter of the peace, on his return from the second embassy, it is charged, was the cause of the increased enmity not of the Athenians towards Thebes, but of the Thebans towards Athens, as well as for the increased gratitude of the Thebans to Philip. Dem. 18. 262: ἦν γάρ ἄσπονδος καὶ ἀκήρυκτος ὑμῖν πρὸς τοὺς θεατὰς πόλεμος: it was the audience surely that 'made war' on the actors and not the actors upon the audience. In Dem. 18. 238: τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Θηβαίους δίκαια means your rights as towards ('in dealing with') the Thebans, what you may rightfully demand of them and what they are in justice bound to render you. In Dem. 48. 46: αὐτῷ οὐδὲν ἐστιν ἔτι πρᾶγμα πρὸς τὰς συνθήκας ταύτας, when compared with Dem. 18. 21: οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμέ, a similar interchange of the sides in a relation may be observed.

This apparent syntactical reversal of the relation between agent and object in such relations gave Demosthenes the opportunity to attempt one more bold experiment for the sake of concise expression of a complex activity. In Dem. 20. 25 we read: χωρὶς δὲ τούτων νυνὶ τῇ πόλει, δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν ὄντοιν, πλούτου καὶ τοῦ πρὸς ἅπαντας πιστεύεσθαι, ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς πίστεως ὑπάρχον. There is something more here than the more common ὑφ' ἁπάντων πιστεύεσθαι would express, or even than the παρά τινι πιστεύεσθαι of Dem. 23. 4, which Weil in his note quotes for comparison;

'to be trusted by all,' or 'in the minds of,' or 'on the part of all,' does not cover the whole meaning. Demosthenes, throughout the oration, is urging the duty of fulfilling to the letter engagements once undertaken. He is here answering the plea that by abolishing the *ἀτέλεια* the city will have more money, and though he might say that, while wealth is not to be despised, 'general confidence, which we already possess, is also a valuable thing,' yet why does he not say, *ὑφ' ἁπάντων*, which would fully express this sense? Why substitute the startling *πρὸς ἅπαντας*? He does so simply because he wishes his audience, not merely to feel the importance of general confidence but to see quite clearly that the keeping of engagements entered into with individuals and states, which he is urging, is the only way to secure that confidence; *πρὸς ἅπαντας* is a short cut to the intimation of this fact, for the *πρός* explicitly introduces the idea of 'dealing with.' The rendering 'in our dealings with all' would seem at first to satisfy all requirements; but it loses sight of the fact that no Athenian, in hearing these words, could fail to find in them a suggestion of those other more familiar phrases, *πιστὸς εἶναι πρός τινα*, *πίστις πρός τινα*, expressing fidelity and loyalty. I do not believe any of Demosthenes' hearers could catch the sound of these words without recognizing instinctively and at once that confidence on the one side rests on good faith on the other; a thought, moreover, that the double-entendre in the *πίστεως* that follows would but emphasize. My rendering, then, of the passage would be 'that our dealings with all men should command their confidence in us.' Just afterwards, in reply to those who sneeringly say, 'what has a city without means to do with what others think of her and her acts?' Demosthenes prays that, whether rich or poor, Athens may always have *τό γε πιστοῖς εἶναι καὶ βεβαίοις δοκεῖν διαμένειν*, 'the reputation of fidelity and steadfastness in her engagements,' where *πεστεύ-*

εσθαι, now reduced to the lower level of opinion, is resolved into πιστοῖς εἶναι δοκεῖν; an indication, it seems to me, that πίστις, on the part of Athens, was clearly present in thought to Demosthenes when he said πρὸς ἅπαντας πιστεύεσθαι. Compare again § 44 of the same oration, where, with reference to Epikerdes of Kyrene, it is said: τοῦτον τὸν—τὴν ἀτέλειαν ἔχοντα οὐχὶ τὴν ἀτέλειαν ἀφαιρήσεσθε (οὐδὲ γὰρ οὕσῃ χρώμενος φαίνεται), ἀλλὰ τὸ πιστεύειν ὑμῖν, οὗ τί γένοιτ' ἂν αἴσχιον: here, in a particular instance, is given the opposite of the general πρὸς ἅπαντας πιστεύεσθαι, only in this case the compact statement is split up into its constituent parts, 'break faith with him, and you lose his trust in you; what shame could be greater?' It must be borne in mind that such a use of πρός with the passive verb was not a familiar one, and that consequently it could not be used without putting a good deal of a strain upon πρός; which is an additional reason for refusing to be satisfied with easy-coming explanations that lay no special stress upon the preposition, leave it in fact quite pointless.

ON SOPHOCLES' ANTIPHONE:

Lines 750–757.

Beginning, for the sake of clearness of connection, with 748, this passage runs thus, according to the traditional arrangement:

ΚΡΕΩΝ. ὁ γοῦν λόγος σοι πᾶς ὑπὲρ κείνης ὅδε.
ΑΙΜΩΝ. καὶ σοῦ γε κἀμοῦ, καὶ θεῶν τῶν νερτέρων.
ΚΡ. ταύτην ποτ' οὐκ ἔσθ' ὡς ἔτι ζῶσαν γαμεῖς. 750.
ΑΙ. ἥδ' οὖν θανεῖται καὶ θανοῦσ' ὀλεῖ τινά.
ΚΡ. ἦ κἀπαπειλῶν ὧδ' ἐπεξέρχει θρασύς;
ΑΙ. τίς δ' ἔστ' ἀπειλὴ πρὸς κενὰς γνώμας λέγειν.
ΚΡ. κλαίων φρενώσεις, ὢν φρενῶν αὐτὸς κενός.
ΑΙ. εἰ μὴ πατὴρ ἦσθ', εἶπον ἄν σ' οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν. 755.
ΚΡ. γυναικὸς ὢν δούλευμα, μὴ κώτιλλέ με.
ΑΙ. βούλει λέγειν τι καὶ λέγων μηδὲν κλύειν.
ΚΡ. ἄληθες; ἀλλ' οὐ, τόνδ' Ὄλυμπον, ἴσθ' ὅτι,
χαίρων ἐπὶ ψόγοισι δεννάσεις ἐμέ.

Objection has been made to this arrangement, by reason of the outburst of Kreon, ἄληθες; κ.τ.λ., which, it is claimed, is hardly justified by the words of Haimon immediately preceding, and again that μὴ κώτιλλέ με ('seek not to wheedle me') is too weak to follow the strong, bold words εἰ μὴ πατὴρ ἦσθ', εἶπον ἂν σ' οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν. Accordingly transpositions have been suggested and adopted by some editors, which should remove this double blemish. It naturally occurred to such as desired to reconstruct the lines, to put 755 immediately before 758; that seemed to satisfy the first difficulty, and it only remained to find a setting for the misplaced 756, which should equally satisfy

the demand for logical propriety of sequence. Two ways were suggested for this:

1. It was proposed by Enger to remove 756 and 757 from their place and insert them, retaining their order, after 749. By this means it was believed that μὴ κώτιλλέ με would be amply justified by the καὶ σοῦ γε of Hæmon in 749.

2. Donner proposed to effect an equally logical arrangement with less violence to tradition by interchanging 755 and 757. The μὴ κώτιλλέ με are then justified by D'Ooge, who adopts this arrangement, by rendering 756: 'Yes, I do not wish to hear; desist, minion of a woman, from wheedling me.'

A third arrangement has been made by Pallis. He follows Enger in placing 755 after 749, but arranges the rest after 756 in the order 755, 754, 757, 750–753, thus making the words κενὰς γνώμας the exciting cause of Kreon's frantic ἄλη θες;

Prof. Jebb, in his admirable edition, has done well in retaining the manuscript order of the lines, and has some interesting and instructive remarks in his support of that order. He calls attention to the fact that if, in 755, the stress be laid upon the condition εἰ μὴ πατὴρ ἦσθ(α), the apparently soft phrase μὴ κώτιλλέ με will be amply justified, for Kreon will in effect be saying, 'Filial respect restrains you from charging me with folly! Do you think to cajole me?' I may add to what he says, that there is no necessity for endeavoring to soften the harshness of what Haimon says in this line. He is thoroughly provoked, it seems to me, and what he lays stress upon is the charge of folly, which he had not previously explicitly made; the qualifying clause, εἰ μὴ πατὴρ ἦσθ(α), does not really soften the statement; it merely means that his relationship to Kreon, and that only, has tied his tongue. But to Kreon the words convey something different: he had already in the

words *κενὰς γνώμες* heard himself impugned as a fool (a sense that Haimon did not intend to put into them at all), so that what is new to him and attracts his attention is this very *εἰ μὴ πατὴρ ἦσθ(α)*, which he takes to be an empty profession of filial respect, with the purpose of taking the edge off the insolent *κενὰς γνώμας*. As to 757, which Jebb prints as a question, he finds in that, under the circumstances a climax, such as is required, in that it is Haimon's assertion of his 'right to maintain his own views against his father's,—*δικὰ δίκης ἰέναι*, as Kreon puts it (742).' The climax unquestionably is there, but I shall endeavor to prove it even stronger than Prof. Jebb's interpretation would make it.

In his negative criticism Jebb is satisfied with saying that by Enger's proposed arrangement 'we lose nothing; but neither do we gain.' This appears to me hardly sufficient; we do lose something very important, as I shall endeavor to show further on.

Donner's interchange of 755 and 757 is settled very effectually by the question as to the aptness of 756 as a reply to 757, for D'Ooge's explanatory translation can hardly be accepted as satisfactory; but at the same time the fitness of the sequence 754–757 is very questionably granted.

Pallis' arrangement is not specifically criticized. But a general remark, intended apparently to apply to all three, is appended, which deserves special attention; it is this: 'The fact is that, in a stormy altercation, we do not look for a closely logical texture, etc., delicately graduated *crescendo*.' The remark is just and would have merited, perhaps, a fuller development, and even a more general application. In a dramatic scene it is not only the logic of thought that demands consideration; there is also the logic of character and the logic of situation to be taken into account. If we cannot present to ourselves the succession of speeches dramatically, that is, if the dead words of the

printed page be not transformed into the living utterances of human beings in definite situations, we cannot fail to misunderstand and misjudge the productions of genuine playwrights. And this dramatic realization of written dialogue is for all of us a matter by no means easy; the familiar contrast between a play read in the closet and a play interpreted by actors to eye and ear on the stage is sufficient at once to explain and to prove my meaning. If we could but hear the author's instructions to his actors as to attitude, gesture and tone of voice, new light could be thrown on the sense and connection of many a passage obscure either in itself or in its connection. Unfortunately, we cannot get this help; and in default of it, it behooves us to be very careful in our logical analysis of the text and in the conclusions we draw from it; we must endeavor to represent to our own minds the utterances in the light of the character in whose mouth they are put, and also as modified by the situation in which that character finds himself at the moment; moreover, we must likewise endeavor to determine the sound (and consequent sense) they would have to the other characters who share in the dialogue. To neglect these precautions and attempt to pass upon the dialogue as a mere logical arrangement of abstract thoughts is quite sure to lead us astray. Now this mistake, it seems to me, as Jebb has rightly recognized, is at the basis of all the readjustments that have been proposed of the present passage. But I am also persuaded that had he followed out to its full extent the principle he has hinted at, he would have taken his stand in favor of the manuscript tradition more vigorously, and would hardly have admitted that 'we lose nothing' by Enger's arrangement, much less that 'other arrangements are possible, and would be nearly as good.'

Kreon was narrow-minded, autocratic, obstinate, weak. His decree, refusing burial to Polyneikos, was due simply to his narrow-mindedness, which prevented his taking into

account any considerations except the 'raison d'état,' as in modern phrase he might have called it. His decree once issued, on grounds that satisfied himself, he demanded absolute unquestioning obedience to it; for he, as ruler of the state, is supreme, autocratic; if he does not say 'L'état c'est moi,' he says something very like it (l. 738): *οὐ τοῦ κρατοῦντος ἡ πόλις νομίζεται*; When news is brought of the violation of his ordinance and the chorus timidly suggest that perhaps there may be divine interference here, he bursts out in a rage at them: Gods favor wickedness! No! there are rebels to authority in the state, and these have found tools to do this outrage for a bribe, and he swears by Zeus that the punishment shall be commensurate with the crime; not death only, but death in torment! When Antigone, caught in the act, is brought before him, and appeals to this same Zeus, by whom he has sworn, and to Justice, invoking the authority of those unwritten principles of right, that antedate and lie at the foundation of all proper human enactments, he has no ear for a plea he cannot understand: proud and stubborn, her stubbornness must be broken, her pride brought low; insolent, she dares defy the laws of her country, and with added insolence presumes to justify the deed and glory in it; she must die. In his interview with Haimon, he goes over the same narrow ground: obedience to the powers that be is the sum total of man's duty: *ἀναρχίας δε μεῖζον οὐκ ἐστὶ κακόν* (672): *σῴζει τὰ πολλὰ σώμαθ' ἡ πειθαρχία*. There is, of course, added the still more imperative duty of obedience to paternal authority; but it is very clear that for Kreon the peculiar validity even of this principle lies in his consciousness that *he* is the father. When in reply to Kreon's harangue, Haimon ventures gently to suggest that there are two parties in the state, the rulers and the ruled, and that some regard must, for expediency's sake, be paid to the sentiments of the latter, who at present are murmuring against his decree, adding at the close that one should

always be ready to listen to good advice; and the chorus, timidly again, chime in with a plea that Haimon's words be listened to, Kreon's obstinacy breaks forth: *οἱ τηλικοίδε καὶ διδαξόμεσθα δὴ | φρονεῖν ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς τηλικοῦδε τὴν φύσιν*; Then follows the stichomythy between Haimon and Kreon, in which there is no argument on Kreon's part, but an ever angrier reiteration of the position he has already taken, his wrath growing as he feels more and more the weakness of his own position, until he begins at last to call names: *ὦ παγκάκιστε* (742), *ὦ μιαρὸν ἦθος καὶ γυναικὸς ὕστερον* (746), *γυναικὸς ὢν δούλευμα*, (756). Haimon, who has endeavored to approach his father in the most careful manner, setting forth that father's own true and best interests as the motives that prompt his interference, for a while keeps his temper passably well, though he cannot avoid retorting the charge of youth (735) and declaring that such principles of rule as Kreon's would better become the 'monarch of a desert;' but, finally, stung by his father's taunts, threats, and, most exasperating of all, misinterpretation of words innocently uttered, he loses all control of himself, and says: 'your fatherhood alone keeps me from calling you a fool;' Kreon's reply to this *γυναικὸς ὢν δούλευμα, μὴ κώτιλλέ με*, 'Prate not to me of fatherhood, thou slave of a woman,' breaks the back of his endurance and he replies *βούλει λέγειν τι καὶ λέγων μηδὲν κλύειν*, 'Thou wouldest speak and then have no reply.' Now this was the exact truth, and Kreon knew it; he would have no reply, no argument as to his decree; but none the less was it the most unpleasant thing that his son could have said, for it meant, as uttered, you can assign no really satisfactory reasons for your act, and take refuge in shutting the mouths of your advisers: Kreon was obstinate and weak, as I have said, and while perfectly satisfied with the justness of his attitude at first, he had heard since other considerations, advanced, partly by Antigone, partly by his son, some based upon grounds of

higher principles, some upon expediency and his own personal interests, which were new to him, and to which, when heard, he had no rational answer to give; he had accordingly, like all obstinate and weak men in such case, sought a refuge in anger, taunts and threats, only to have the utter weakness of his attitude unmasked in these words by his son in the presence of his people, as represented by the chorus. Whoever has seen an obstinate man so brought to bay, will not wonder at his shriek (ἄλη θες;) of rage. What has been said, I think, justifies me in wishing that Prof. Jebb had changed the interrogation mark at the end of 757 to a period: to throw Haimon's words into a question, weakens them and renders them by so much less appropriate to their place. It is but just to observe, however, that Prof. Jebb in his translation of the line (given above) does not use the interrogative form: the punctuatian of the text is therefore probably a typographical oversight. In view of the above, too, I must think that any alteration of the order of the lines would cause a serious loss; this, however, will appear yet more clearly from what follows. There is nothing more characteristic of a weak and obstinate person, who finds in an argument that grows gradually into an altercation, that he is having the worst of it, than that he should lose his head and reply to isolated words and phrases rather than to the sense of his opponent's utterances. So with Kreon here. The phrase θεῶν τῶν νερτέρων of 749 catches his ear and leads to 750: ταύτην ποτ' οὐκ ἔσθ' ὡς ἔτι ζῶσαν γαμεῖς: '*she* is *dead* for you.' The last words of 751 (which Haimon utters more to himself than his father) are misinterpreted and lead to 752. So the κενὰς γνώμας of 753, which are not meant to charge his father with being a fool, but declare only the folly of his present purpose, are misunderstood as of general application to all Kreon's acts, and draw forth the threat of 754, ending with the taunting reëcho of κενός. This charge of folly wrings from Haimon his counter-charge, the bitterness of which is

hardly qualified by the condition εἰ μὴ πατὴρ ἦσθ(α). To Kreon, who had already heard, as he thought, the charge of folly in 753, this condition, though not so meant by Haimon, seemed the significant phrase: hence the contemptuous rejection of 756; a rejection accompanied by a repetition in more offensive form yet of the taunts of ll. 740, 746, 747, in so offensive a form, indeed, as to cause Haimon to break all bounds and utter to the ears of his scarce crediting father the verte vérité of 757.

Enger's transposition breaks the above indicated connection between 749 and 750, that between 755 and 756, and really destroys the climax of the close by substituting a charge of folly for one of inveterate obstinacy and pigheadedness, which is the worst an obstinate man can hear.

Donner's breaks the connection between 754 and 755, and destroys the climax. Pallis' breaks the connection between κενὰς γνώμας (753) and κενὸς (754) and like the others destroys the real climax.

There is none of these arrangements, then, by which something is not lost; there is none by which anything is really gained.